The Bombay Explosion-1944 – The freighter SS Fort Stikine, carrying a mixed load of cargo (including over 1,400 tons of explosive) caught fire and was destroyed in 2 giant blasts. The explosions scattered debris, sank the surrounding ships and killed 740 people while injuring a further 1,800.
The SS Fort Stikine, a 7,142 gross ton freighter sailed from Birkenhead, England on February 24 via Gibraltar and reached Karachi on March 30 where she unloaded some of her cargo which consisted of but not limited to crated spitfires, munitions, scrap iron, gold bars and around 1,400 tons of explosive. To fill up the empty hold sulphur, cotton bales, timber, lubricating oil drums, turpentine, fish manure, rice and resin etc were also loaded at Karachi flouting all the norms. The ship arrived at Bombay on April 12 but the unloading started on April 14 only.
The SS Fort Stikine underway in 1943
Exact cause of fire is not known and the incidence was then suppressed and not much publicity was given due to ongoing World War-II. Many persons at time had thought that Japan has attacked Bombay like the pearl Harbour. The aftermath of the explolsions
Debris were thrown about 2000 feet (600 metres) high and fell on several civilian populations causing death and injuries to several hundred. The blast also sent a shower of gold ingots over Bombay. The gold bricks also injured several persons. Some bricks fell into the sea and other areas. To the surprise of many gold bricks crashed through roofs and fell in their homes.
A huge tidal wave swept across the dock and ripped ships from their moorings, one ship finished atop a warehouse.
Fort Stikine was a cargo ship that first came to my attention when I was constructing the
Benjidog Tower Hill website. I noticed that the WW2 memorial to those with "No grave but the sea"
contained several panels for ships that had met their fate due to the explosion of Fort Stikine.
Recently I came across information
that I had not seen before whilst working on re-publication of
material from the MerchantNavyOfficers.com website that closed down a
couple of years ago
on the death of its owner and this inspired me to create this page.
The 'Fort' ships were a class of 198 cargo ships built in Canada
during WW2 for use by the United Kingdom under the Lend-Lease scheme.
They all had
names prefixed with 'Fort' when built. The ships were in service
between 1942 and 1985 with two still listed on shipping registers in
1992. They were built
at eighteen different Canadian shipyards and there were three
variations of the basic design. The North Sands type were of riveted construction and
the Canadian and Victory types were of welded construction. I presume that Fort Stikine
belonged to one of the latter
two subclasses but have been unable to discover which. The vessel was
named after a historic fort and fur trade post whose site is now
occupied by
Wrangell in Alaska. The Stikine river had been a route to the
Klondike during the 'Gold Rush'.
The destruction and death caused by the explosion on Fort Stikine
resulted mainly from bad practice in the mix and stowage of cargo.
It is easy to say this in hindsight, but too many corners were cut in
desperation during the war and blame should not be attributed to the
Captain and
crew who, when they raised objections, were told in no uncertain
terms to "Shut up and get on with it" with the addition of the commonly
used phrase
"Don't you know there is a war on?"
To me the most inspiring aspect of this story is the courage of
the crew and the local fire brigade in trying to bring under control
the fire that led to the eventual destruction of several ships and a
large area of the harbour. In colloquial terms, put in their shoes,
"you wouldn't have seen my arse for dust" when the fire started
knowing what the cargo consisted of. Many of these brave men died. As a
mark of respect I
have included below the names of the members of the Fire Service that
lost their lives as well as merchant seamen.
Fort Stikine took part in 41 convoys and many
independent voyages during WW2 according to information shown in the
table below which is provided courtesy
of Convoyweb - see External. Ref. #4.
Fort Stikine was destroyed in at least two terrible explosions.
There follows a newsreel video and a number of accounts of what happened
from different sources. Note: I have not checked these accounts for accuracy and republish them with only minor changes to
standardise the presentation style.
Newsreel
The link below should enable you to see a short contemporary
newsreel from Universal Pictures in the USA. Click on the little square
box to the right of the controls to enlarge the view.
Captain Brinley Thomas Oberst, a British Army Officer attached to
the Indian Army Ordinance Corps., had returned home to his apartment at
Colaba for lunch. As he was finishing his lunch the telephone rang
informing him that there was a fire aboard a ship berthed in the
Victoria
Dock. Captain Oberst enquired as to the name of the vessel, the
reply 'I don't know' did nothing to calm his nerves for lying in that
dock
were four ships loaded with explosives not least Fort Stikine whose cargo contained a great deal. It was just after 1400
hours when the Captain made his way down to the docks where his men were onboard Fort Stikine
supervising the discharge of
her highly dangerous cargo. On arriving at the docks Captain Oberst
had his worst fears confirmed when he was informed that it was
Fort Stikine that was on fire. Fort Stikine
was lying at Number One berth and was one of fourteen ships
being worked that day, next door in Prince's Dock were a further ten
ships including one in dry dock. Both the docks were situated behind
lock gates and a further two ships were tied up alongside the wall.
On boarding the ship, Captain Oberst observed very little evidence
of a fire; in fact there were just a few men stood around Number Two
hatch
playing a couple of hoses down into the hold - the hold was situated
directly forward of the Bridge. Captain Oberst then encountered Mr
Harris
the ship's Second Officer who was helping the firemen drag the hoses
across the deck. After Oberst introduced himself, both Officers made
for
Harris's cabin where the stowage plans were laid out. After a brief
discussion which revolved around the positioning of the explosives in
relationship to the seat of the fire, Oberst declared that unless
the fire was quickly extinguished the whole of the dock was under
threat.
Fort Stikine had been completed in the July of 1942
by the Prince Rupert Drydock & Shipyard at Prince Rupert, British
Columbia, Canada. She weighed 7,142 tons gross and had been handed
over to the United States Shipping Admin/Maritime Commission who in turn
bareboat chartered her to the British Government. His Majesty's
Government then appointed Port Line as managers. She was classed at
Lloyds
Register as + 100A1 which had long been accepted as an all round
standard of excellence. Captain Naismith was in command; it was his
first
position as Captain and he had been with her since arriving on that
fateful day in Bombay. Under his command she had made four complete
round
trips and had been loaded for her fifth trip, this time to Karachi
and Bombay with the following cargo:
Deep in the holds were 1,395 tons of explosives including shells,
torpedoes, mine signal rockets, magnesium flares and incendiary bombs,
and these were for discharge at Bombay.
Above these lay twelve crated Spitfires and more explosives for
discharge at Karachi and finally gliders were stacked on the upper
decks.
More specifically in the tween decks of Number Two hold 238 tons of
highly sensitive Category A explosives had been stacked on three sides,
on the fourth side a steel container measured 5ft x 4ft x 4ft had
been lashed. Within the container were thirty-one wooden crates, each
crate contained four gold ingots measuring 15" x 3" x 1.5", each bar
weighed two stone and was a part instalment to a bank in Bombay which
was to be used to cancel out the adverse effect that the British War
economy was having on the exchange rates in India. The estimated value
of
the gold varied from a low of £1,000,000 to a high of £2,000,000
depending on source of information. Either way it was a considerable
amount in
1944. Mr. Harris the Second Officer had signed for the bullion in
Birkenhead and as an extra precaution had arranged for the locked
container
lid to be welded closed, the lads having already disposed of this
cargo in their minds on the voyage out to India.
Fort Stikine sailed from Birkenhead on the 24th of
February and soon formed up into a twenty ship convoy. On her voyage
north
the convoy was joined by further vessels which had sailed from
Belfast and Glasgow. Finally the convoy had grown to fifty ships
excluding her
escorts, this included two Merchant Aircraft Carriers, formerly
tankers, Shell's Amastra seen below was a typical example of
what were affectionately referred to as 'Woolworths'.
Note: According to Convoyweb (Arnold Hague's convoy database), Fort Stikine
had sailed on 23 February 1944 from Liverpool in
convoy OS 69KM then OS 69 arriving Gibraltar on 6 March 1944. She
then joined convoy KMS 43 from Gibraltar, arriving at Port Said on 16
March 1944.
From there she sailed independently through the Suez Canal to Aden
(arriving 23 March 1944) and Karachi (arriving 30 March 1944). She
joined
convoy PB 74 which departed Karachi 9 April 1944 and arrived at
Bombay 12 April 1944.
The first leg of the voyage to Gibraltar wasn't without incident.
During adverse weather conditions, two airmen were killed attempting to
land their
Swordfish on the deck of a 'Woolworth'. A lesser incident occurred
on Fort Stikine when a stowaway gave himself up.
Captain Naismith
couldn't land the miscreant and so he was sent to work down below
under the charge of the Chief Engineer, Alexander Gow. Gow reflected at
the time
that young John O'Hare from Liverpool could have chosen a safer ship
to stow away on loaded as she was to the gunnels with high explosives.
On arriving at the Straits of Gibraltar the convoy split into two, Fort Stikine's half headed into the Mediterranean, the remainder
set course for West Africa. Fort Stikine was joined a few hours later by further vessels which had sailed from the States for the
voyage out to India and Pakistan, again Fort Stikine was allocated an outside lane for obvious reasons. The convoy proceeded along
the North African Coast and most of the ships hoisted a barrage balloon including Fort Stikine
as a defence against air attack,
this action must have slowed progress quite considerably. When off
Algiers the convoy was attacked by four Focke-Wulf Condors, fortunately
passing
over Fort Stikine's line and opening fire on the
second. For the next half hour of daylight and well into dusk the
Germans
maintained their attacks on the convoy and it was presumed by all in
the convoy that it was shortage of fuel that forced the planes to
return to
their base when the attack was broken off.
The convoy proceeded into the Mediterranean without further mishap
and again divided South of Sicily into two groups, the larger group
turning
north towards Italy, with Fort Stikine and eleven others maintaining their course for Port Said. After entering the Canal,
Fort Stikine anchored at Port Taufiq to take on bunkers and fortunately her stowaway John O'Hare was handed over to the Authorities.
Having completed her bunkers, Fort Stikine then sailed through the Canal, Red Sea and after calling at Aden for stores, made her
way to her first port of call, Karachi.
Karachi to Bombay
Fort Stikine arrived in Karachi at 1500 hours on
the 30th of March. After discharging the crated gliders and Spitfires,
the ship's
Officers then began the task of filling the vacated space with 8,700
bales of raw cotton, drums of lube oil, timber, scrap iron, sulphur,
fish manure,
rice and resin. To say that they were more than a little alarmed at
what they were expected to carry would be putting it mildly. So much so
that Captain
Naismith complained to the Shippers, their response was in effect
'Didn't he know that there was a War on?' The last straw was on the 7th
of April when
750 drums of turpentine turned up with the Shippers proposing that
the highly inflammable concoctions be placed on top of the ship's coal
bunkers,
Captain Naismith turned them down flat. All the Deck Officers voiced
their concerns over the stowage of cotton with lube oil in the same
hold as explosives
but couldn't find any reference books on the ship or ashore and so
it was with a great deal of misgivings that the cargo was loaded.
In fact two years earlier a book had been published by the United
States Government printing office written by Joseph Leming and it said
the following:
On the carriage of cotton:
In storing cotton two factors require consideration: stowing so
as to get the largest possible number of bales in the ship, but guarding
against the
danger of fire either from loading or during the voyage.
Adequate dunnage and mats should be used and all iron plates in
the hold of the vessel should be well covered with burlap or mats.
Every vessel carrying cotton should be equipped with either
steam or chemical fire extinguishers and they should be thoroughly
inspected and
overhauled before commencing to receive the cargo.
While loading or discharging cotton, the fire hoses should be
ready for immediate use and water barrels and buckets should be at hand
near the
hatches. 'No Smoking' notices should be posted and the ship's
Officers should rigidly enforce this order. All galley funnels should be
covered
with gauze or other suitable material to prevent sparks reaching the
cargo.
Cotton bales which are, or have been, in contact with oil or
grease are very liable to spontaneous combustion. For this reason cotton
should never
be loaded in holds which have recently been painted unless it is
certain the paint has thoroughly dried or hardened. For this same reason
cotton
bales should not be stowed close to any oily or greasy goods.
Wet cotton bales are not liable to spontaneous combustion
although this was for many years believed to be the case. Such bales
will, however,
deteriorate if stowed in a confined space and it is recommended that
all wet or damp bales, as well as those with torn wrappers and missing
bands, be refused.
During the voyage it is advisable to have all the ventilators
covered with wire gauze to prevent carelessly thrown matches from
entering the
cargo holds and possibly starting a serious fire.
A further publication from the U.S. stated the necessity for keeping
lubricating oil and raw cotton well separated if stowed in the same
hold.
It then added when carrying cotton and explosives they should never
be carried in the same hold and should be stowed at opposite ends of the
ship.
Also for all Officers of Fort Stikine this
information was not available, British Ministry of War Transport
pamphlets which
were accessible and dealt with explosives made no mention of cotton
whatsoever. Prior to sailing, the Chief Officer Mr. Harris gathered his
deck
crew together and tested all the ship's fire fighting equipment and
Captain Naismith declared he was to hold an extra fire drill once the
ship
had left Karachi. With five civilian watchmen, a crew member on the
gangway and two Dems Gunners patrolling the deck, an Officer on watch
and
two Pakistan policemen on or near the ship it's fair to say that
sabotage was not a factor in events which were to follow. The cotton was
stowed in the lower hold, wood and then scrap iron were placed on
top and then the lower hatch covers were put into place. Before the
lube oil could be stowed it was discovered that one of the drums was
definitely leaking with others suspect, so Harris laid tarpaulin and
nailed
it down himself over the lower hold covers. The American regulations
stipulated that no more than 250 barrels of oil should be carried in
the same hold as raw cotton and then separated by the length of the
hold, Fort Stikine loaded a thousand barrels and it was
stacked immediately above the cotton.
Considering that three holds - Numbers Two, Three and Four -
contained mixtures of explosives and ammunition it was hardly surprising
that
Captain Naismith declared to Harris and Henderson "We are carrying
just about everything that will either burn or blow up". "The least we
can do
is to have extra fire drills". Harris duly organised the drills and
was pleased the way the men carried them out, each one no doubt mindful
of
what lay beneath his feet. Fort Stikine sailed from Karachi on the 9th of April and joined a convoy of tankers for the voyage
to Bombay.
Fort Stikine arrived at Bombay in the early hours
of the 12th of April and anchored in the Roads which lay between Bombay
Island
and the mainland. The pilot arrived a few minutes before 1000 hours;
the ship then made her way towards Victoria Dock and arrived alongside
at
midday. No-one within the dock area was aware of her dangerous cargo
because the flying of the 'Red Flag' had been discontinued for the
duration
as the ships flying the flag were quite well aware of being 'The
Target Ship' in the event of an air raid. Under normal conditions ships
carrying
explosives were not allowed alongside and were discharged into
lighters. Because of the war this prohibition had been lifted.
Explosives fall into three categories, A,B and C. The least
dangerous 'C' could be loaded into warehouses and await transport, 'B'
had to be
loaded into waiting wagons for immediate carriage, and the highly
sensitive 'A' could only be off-loaded into lighters moored alongside
the ship
and never on the quay. Fort Stikine was immediately
granted 'A' certificate of grave urgency by Major R.C.R. Hawkes on
behalf
of the Embarkation Commandant and work commenced a short while later
when all five hold hatches covers were lifted. No lighters arrived to
unload the category 'A' explosives until the following afternoon
despite the grave urgency certificate issued by Major Hawkes.
Discharging the Cargo
Work commenced on discharging other cargo including the drummed lube
oil onto the jetty. The Foreman Stevedore Shapoorjee Desai noticed that
after
discharging the drums from both Number One and Two holds, quite a
few of the drums were leaking and that the tarpaulins nailed down by
Harris has
a slick of oil covering them. It was at this juncture that an extra
gang were employed to work Number One hold to facilitate the rapid
discharge
of the fish manure which by now was causing distress to all onboard.
The gang worked all night and it was this action which created much
discussion
at the later commission of enquiry. Could for instance one of the
labour force have climbed the ladder out of Number One hold into the
forward
Mast house, gone through the bulkhead door should it have been
unlocked and descended into Number Two hold for a cigarette unseen?
Sadly for all
concerned conjecture and not a solution. The Second Officer, Harris
was convinced the interconnecting door was locked, Edward, the Third
Officer
however said that the key had been given to the Foreman Stevedore to
ease access to Number One hold and that the door had been open for most
of the night. On the morning of the thirteenth, Sergeant McPhee of
the Ordinance Corps, one of Captain Oberst's men discussed with Desai
the
Foreman Stevedore exactly where the separate categories of
explosives were to be landed. The lighters for the category 'A'
explosives arrived
at midday. At the same time an officer from the M.O.W.T. met with
Alex Gow, the Chief Engineer to discuss the necessary maintenance
required in
the Engine Room the most difficult of which was the intermediate
slide valve on the main engine; the official sanctioned the repair work.
Gow along with his engineers and shore side fitters commenced work
immediately thus rendering the ship immovable except by tug.
Outbreak of Fire
At midday the stevedores broke for lunch and as it turned out so did
the civilian watchmen, a matter unknown to Captain Naismith, his
Officers
or the two Dems Gunners who were patrolling the ship both forward
and aft. At half past twelve smoke was seen to be emitting from the
ventilators
of Number Two hold by the Chief Officer of Fort Crevier which lay across the dock at Number Eleven berth. Two other men on
Fort Crevier spotted the same smoke a short while later and a Dems Gunner on S.S. Iran
also reported seeing it.
Sub-Inspector Critchell of the Bombay Police in the dockside tower
remembered seeing it at half past one but, as like many other witnesses,
dismissed the idea that anything was seriously wrong on the premise
that if it was those onboard would have had the situation in hand. It
wasn't
until another fifteen minutes had passed that the smoke was spotted
by Mohamed Taqi a foreman whose gang had recommenced work in Number Two
hold.
As the smoke thickened the stevedores began to scramble out of the
hold shouting warnings to those above of the imminent danger. At the
same time
members of Fort Stikine's crew spotted the smoke and raised the alarm.
On hearing the shouts of 'Fire' Alex Gow quickly entered the Engine
Room and started the fire pump, Harris the Second Mate with the aid of
the Deck
Crew ran out a hose to Number Two hatchway and they were soon joined
by other Crew Members with more hoses; and water was directed into the
hold.
A standard precaution in the docks was to have an emergency trailer
pump with a full crew standing by when a ship was being discharged.
Alerted
that something was terribly wrong by the stampede to get off Fort Stikine,
the Section Leader gave the order to get onboard
with their hoses and remembering that the ship contained explosives
ordered his Sub Leader to contact the Fire Brigade Control Room and give
them
a 'Number Two' message.
Unfortunately the Sub-Officer was unable to get through to the
Control Room on the telephone and broke the glass on the fire alarm out
of sheer
desperation, all this effectively did was to alert the Fire Brigade
to the existence of a fire, not that it involved explosives!
Consequently
only two engines were dispatched. Meanwhile onboard with five hoses
playing into the hold those involved began to feel mildly optimistic.
In an attempt to discover the seat of the fire Henderson the Mate
accompanied by one of the Firemen descended into the hold to ascertain
just exactly where it was. Due to the density of the smoke both men
climbed back out of the hold and the five hoses continued to pour in
water
blindly. Within eight minutes the two engines arrived at Number One
berth and six more hoses were added to the five already in situ On
learning that explosives were onboard, the Officer in charge,
Mobarak Singh notified the Control Room that it was a 'Number Two'
situation and
more help was required. Five minutes later Major Oberst arrived and
as we know made the declaration that unless the fire was extinguished
rapidly the whole of the dock area was under threat.
Within minutes a meeting was held on deck between Oberst, Naismith,
Henderson, Harris, Gow and Commander J.H. Longmire of the Royal Indian
Navy
who was the Chief Salvage Officer in Bombay, and had arrived onboard
to offer assistance. Oberst declared that Fort Stikine
had the equivalent explosive power onboard equal to 150 Blockbusters
and the only option open to the Captain was to scuttle his ship.
However
the depth of the water in which Fort Stikine was
lying ruled out winching her over and the bilge lines were all fixed
with
non-return valves which negated flooding the hold. Gow stated that
the Engine and Boiler Rooms could be flooded but he doubted whether this
would be sufficient to sink her. As previously stated the depth of
water in the dock also ruled out this possibility. Oberst had no power
onboard Fort Stikine and could only advise, his powers came into force once the explosives had been landed, and he again
reiterated his fears to the ship's Captain.
Meanwhile on receiving the 'Number Two' message the Fire Brigade
Control Room dispatched a further eight engines, the switchboard also
informed
the Chief of Bombay Fire Brigade, Mr. Norman Coombs and both arrived
at the scene within minutes of each other. By this time 32 hoses were
playing into the hold and Coombs tried to assess where the seat of
the fire was from the deck. Finding the task impossible he called for
volunteers to go down into the hold, Mobarak Singh and Arthur
Reynolds, a Fire Officer with the Bombay Port Trust, answered his call.
Donning smoke helmets both men descended into the hold but were
forced back, not by the smoke, but by the intense heat now being
generated
in the Tween Deck. Aware that detonators lay in Number One hold
adjacent to the bulkhead with Number Two, Harris with Crew members that
could
be spared along with Ordinance men attempted to move them forward
out of danger. By 14:45 hours the bulkhead dividing these two holds had
become increasingly hot and the men in Number One could hear
ammunition exploding in Number Two. On deck further discussion was
taking place
as to the viability of introducing steam into the hold and battening
down the hatches. Gow's opinion was that it was impossible to close
down the lower hatch because of the heat and that by battening the
upper hatch only made the space to be smothered too great. Coombs
ordered
five more engines and also asked for Colonel J.R. Sadler the dock's
General Manager to come down to the ship. At this juncture Coombs was
unaware that Oberst the explosives expert was onboard. Some
discussion took place as to Captain Naismith's inability to reach a
decision
as to the scuttling of his ship; none were aware that the depth of
water beneath her keel would have allowed this anyway.
Colonel Sadler arrived onboard at 1450 Hrs and after surveying the hold informed the Captain that Fort Stikine
should be
floated out of the harbour. Yet another piece of inadequate advice
for Captain Naismith to consider; he knew that his ships engine was
disabled due to the repair work and the only way Fort Stikine
could vacate the dock was with the assistance of tugs.
An argument then ensued between Sadler and Coombs as to the merits
of the formers solution, Sadler's parting shot was that she would
most probably blow up long before she could be towed to deep water.
Coombs however remained optimistic that his crew's efforts would
prevail,
after all they had saved sixty ships in the past at an average of
one a month and fifteen of those had been carrying explosives.
Two water boats arrived on the scene shortly after 1500Hrs, the Doris was able to play three hoses, the Panwell
a further six. None of the high profile men now onboard Fort Stikine
felt that he could take overall command of the increasingly
dangerous situation, of the two men authorised to do so ashore
neither could be contacted, namely The Commodore, Royal Indian Navy,
Bombay and
the Naval Officer in Charge, Bombay. Therefore onboard the ship was
three conflicting points of view as to how best to cope with the problem
and who if any had the authority to make a decision. Captain
Naismith wanted to save his ship, Sadler his docks and Coombs wanted
Fort Stikine to stay where she was so his crew could concentrate on extinguishing the fire. Oberst however doubted that
none of the men could comprehend what was about to happen when Fort Stikine blew up as she was sure to do in his opinion.
At just after 1500Hrs Coombs was passed the information that a hot
spot had appeared on the port side just above deck level. He at last had
his
seat of the fire. His first decision was to cut a hole in the three
eighths thick steel which constituted the ships hull using an
oxy-acetylene
set which would enable his crews to direct their hoses right at the
heart of the fire. However due to the inadequacy of the first set on the
docks and a delay in receiving a set sent for from the authorities
his solution was not to be. Conditions onboard deteriorated rapidly, on
the upper deck the plates had become so hot that Coombs ordered
water to be played on them, his firemen were now standing in water that
was beginning
to boil! There was that much water in the hold some nine hundred
tons, that the bales of cotton were by now floating around inside
creating further havoc.
Palmer having given up on the defective oxy-acetylene ashore went back onboard Fort Stikine
and took charge of the firemen on the
port side, Coombs remained with his men on the starboard side. The
floating bales by now had ignited the dunnage which had been used to
pack
round the cases of ammunition. At 1515Hrs the explosives caught fire
and thick black smoke poured up through the hatches engulfing the
firemen
still playing their hoses. This was quickly followed by flames
leaping above the hatch coaming, at the same time burning pieces of
cotton spewed
skywards drifting away from Fort Stikine
threatening other ships tied up in the docks. Palmer and Coombs rallied
their men once
more and to a man they all returned to the hatch carrying their
hoses. The following five minutes saw the flames rise and fall until at
1550Hrs a
giant flame shot out of the hold, even passing the height of the
ships mast. Coombs screamed the order for his men to "Get Clear".
Palmer and his men jumped onto the jetty many sustaining broken
limbs, Coombs and his party jumped into the water. Palmer with those
able
bodied started to tackle the fires breaking out at number one shed,
Coombs tackled the blaze at number fourteen with those men which had
successfully crossed the dock.
Explosions
At the same time that Coombs gave the order for his men to stand
down, Captain Naismith issued the order to abandon ship. His men who had
remained onboard throughout scrambled down the gangway followed by
their Captain and Chief Officer. Naismith, not sure everyone was
accounted
for, returned onboard for one last look round to make sure. Having
assured himself that all were ashore, he retraced his steps down the
gangway
and started to walk aft to join up with Henderson and Stevens. As he
approached them at the vessel's stern Fort Stikine
exploded
throwing Stevens, many yards along the quay, Stevens came round
totally naked and alone, of Naismith and Henderson no trace was ever
found.
The clock in the dockyard tower was stopped when the first explosion
occurred, 1606Hrs and remained so for many months. Oberst was flung up
in the
air by the blast and landed on a pile of dunnage, as he surveyed the
scene around him in the gloom he observed bodies lying all around, most
with
their skin burnt off. Of the firemen in the immediate vicinity forty
were killed outright. Fort Stikine was blown in two
and
her boiler, still intact, was found a half mile away from number one
berth. A huge tidal wave swept across the dock and ripped ships from
their
moorings, one ship finished astride a warehouse and Jalapadma finished up alongside what was left of Fort Stikine.
At 1633Hrs as Coombs stared across the dock surveying the scene of
destruction, the second explosion occurred throwing debris 2,000ft into
the air.
Jalapadma's poop deck along with her twelve pounder gun was blown clear over the warehouse to land some 200 yards distant. British
India's Baroda which had been set on fire by the first explosion when parts of number four shed fell onboard was blown across the
end of the adjacent berth when the second explosion occurred.
This secondary explosion wrecked Baroda, the
remaining crew onboard had abandoned ship when she caught fire leaving
Chief
Officer James, Chief Engineer Stewart, his Fourth Engineer and the
Purser to fight the fire on their own. The second explosion had
rendered the Chief Engineer unconscious and he fell beneath a
stokehold ventilator. The three remaining Officers attempted to lower
him
into the water but because of obstructions and their own weakness
were forced to abandon not only Mr Stewart but Baroda
herself. A rescue party arrived on the scene and with the assistance of the Fourth Engineer made an attempt to re-board Baroda
and rescue her Chief Engineer, sadly for Mr Stewart the heat and
intensity of the flames drove them back and the attempt had to be
abandoned.
As well as Chief Engineer Stewart, Captain S.A. Kiely of Shirala also perished in the explosion.
Witness Account by Derek Ings
The account which follows is Mr Derek P. Ings personnel memories of that fateful day. Derek had joined H.M.T. Chantilly as
Assistant Purser in October of 1943. His account first appeared in the B.I. News No 61 in October of 1969.
Chantilly had arrived in Bombay on the 3rd of March, had discharged her American Troops and in the days preceeding the
explosion her crew had been informed that the ship was to be converted for use as Hospital Ship, No. 63.
Chantilly had been requisitioned in 1941 and
managed by B.I.S.N., then to Gray, Dawes & Co but still retained her
B.I. Officers. She served in the Liner Division, first as a
Personnel Ship before being converted for use as a Hospital Ship in
Bombay.
She was returned to her French owners at Wars end and was finally
scrapped in Marseilles in 1952.
After twenty five years the memory loses its edge but I recall that
for me Friday, 14th April 1944, started out much as any other day at
that time. I was Assistant Purser of Chantilly and at that time she was undergoing conversion from a troopship to
become a hospital ship.
I remember going ashore during the afternoon for a haircut. On the
return to the ship at about 4.15 p.m. I was walking along a road
just inside Alexandra Dock from Green Gate when I became conscious
that smoke and flames were shooting high into the sky in the
distance immediately in front of me. Before I could fully realise
what was happening the ground around was shaken by a tremendous
explosion which made me step back a pace or two and raise my hands
as though to protect myself.
My next recollection is of the surrounding confusion as the people
in the dock area took to their heels in no uncertain manner. I made
my way to Chantilly which was lying on the outer
wall of Alexandra Dock. I expected that a nearby tanker had exploded
but as I neared the berth I could see that the explosion had taken
place further away than I had thought, and in fact it was in
Victoria Dock.
All the while there were minor explosions but at approximately 4.45
p.m. there was another explosion as violent, if not more so, than
the first. By this time I was back onboard and the whole ship shook
as though hit by a torpedo. A number of windows, window frames
and door locks were shattered and shrapnel from the explosion, about
three quarters of a mile away, fell on and around the ship.
I had to return ashore shortly afterwards and, passing through the
dock area, found abandoned vehicles and dhows at many points, some
of the dhows in the stream with their cargoes of cotton ablaze.
My journey took me through Green Gate and along Ballard Road to St.
George's Hospital where I intended visiting a shipmate. It was now
an hour after the first explosion and all the shops, stalls and
eating places had closed. Many of the windows of offices and shops
had been blown out and glass and roof tiles were strewn everywhere.
There were some people in the streets, mostly office or shop
workers, but there was no sign of the sweeper class.
I reached the hospital at about 5.30 p.m. passing a dead gharry
horse lying at the entrance. My friend had been put out of his bed
to make room for the injured that were arriving by ambulance in a
very dirty and bedraggled condition. Mattresses were being put
down all over the ground floor to treat the casualties.
On my way back to the ship I could see the R.I.N. sailors being sent
by lorry to fight the fire at Victoria Dock, the pall of smoke
from which hung like a cloud over the whole of the city.
The police had now closed the Red Gate and I had to walk round to
Green Gate to get back into the docks. On the way round, and
only a few yards from Mackinnons' office, I came upon a piece of
twisted steel plate about twelve inches by six inches which had
been blown over a mile by the explosion to land harmlessly in the
road.
There was now more movement in the docks and the Indian Army was
busy pulling dhows away to clear the locks. I was able to cross
to the other side by jumping from one dhow to another as they were
moving.
As I neared the ship I saw some of the crew leaving hurriedly and
found that another explosion ( of 1200 cylinders of H.P. gas ) was
expected at any time and we were warned to keep off the decks.
The earlier explosions had flung incendiary bombs over a wide area
and small fires were burning everywhere. There were now thirty
burning dhows in the stream and, as they sank, their cargoes of
cotton still smoldered on the surface. The ships on the harbour wall,
including ourselves and Mantola, put down boats to rescue the dhow crews.
Darkness fell and the night sky reflected the blazing parts of the
city. I watched from the monkey island and could hear the hiss of
the cylinders as they ignited one by one.
I turned in at 11.00 p.m. to the sound of the occasional explosion
of gas cylinders and with a burning dhow outside my port.
Next morning the fire was reported to be under control but the smoke
still poured skywards. The only explosions to be heard were
those caused by the demolition parties. During the morning I walked
towards the scene of the explosion and, whilst still in
Alexandra Dock, saw several large steel plates, all twisted and
torn, too heavy for one person to lift.
By this time Alexandra Dock had been almost cleared of ships, only two were left and we were on four hour' notice. The Ismailia
had been loading explosives just across from where we were lying and
there had been a tanker lying ahead of us flying the danger flag.
The fire continued to burn for all of that day and for the following
night; by this time dead bodies were to be seen floating in
the water off the ship.
It was not until sometime afterwards that I was able to learn the
full story leading to the catastrophe. At that period of war-time
restrictions, the newspapers were unable to print the facts, but I
see from "The Evening News of India" dated 15th of April that
the explosion took a relative minor place compared with the news of
the rout of the Germans in the Crimea.
The culprit was the Fort Stikine, where fire had
broken out at 1.30 p.m. on the 14th of April; the ship having been
loaded with cotton and other combustibles on top of explosives in
the lower holds. The cotton had self-combusted and although the
Bombay fire brigade had tried to put out the blaze their efforts
were without avail and it was too late to take the ship out into
the harbour before the first explosion took place.
In all 27 ships were destroyed in Victoria and Princess Docks, including the Baroda whose Chief Engineer Officer,
Mr James Stewart, was lost with the ship, Captain S.A.Kiely who was in command of Shirala at the time also died
in the explosion.
A further 25 firemen had been killed in the second explosion with 83
injured leaving the fire brigade all but decimated. Many people were
killed outside the dock area by falling shrapnel and shells which
exploded on impact, many buildings collapsed and others were set on
fire.
In amongst the debris falling from the sky were the 28lb ingots of
gold, one of the first to be found was picked up by Burjorji Motiwala a
retired Parsee Civil Engineer. The ingot had crashed through the
buildings corrugated roof, penetrated the floor of the balcony above and
come to rest on his balcony in the corner. The bar was stamped
Z13256 and was worth 90,000 Rupee's, Mr Motiwala received a reward of
999
Rupee's which he donated to the relief fund.
Within the docks fire raged in most of the warehouses and on many of
the ships. The firemen and volunteers, many of them servicemen, were
hampered to a large extent by the amount of debris floating on the
water which blocked the pump suction filters.
Map showing position of ships after the explosions
[3]
Debris floating in the docks in a solid mass after the explosions
[3]
The chaos and lack of organisation which had occurred aboard Fort Stikine
extended beyond and hampered the efforts of those
who now found themselves fighting the fires within the immediate
dock area. A typical example occurred when Army Officers marched into a
brigade station and requisitioned the remaining pumps, handed them
over to inexperienced soldiers and left 68 firemen with no means of
fighting
anything. The area of fire extended out from the epicentre by
approximately 900 yards and included all of Victoria and Princess Docks,
the
Godown estate to the West, the Burmah Oil installation to the North
and the Rice Market to the South. On the Western side it had gone beyond
the Godowns and had set fire to many of the dwellings of the poorer
natives who lived on the fringes of the city proper. It took four more
days
to extinguish the main fire and for a further two weeks smaller
fires continued to smolder in the ruins.
231 people were killed attached to the various services which
included the fire brigade and dock employees; another 476 were injured.
Outside
the docks over 500 civilians were killed and a further 2,408 were
injured. Thirteen ships were lost,
Fort Stikine, Baroda, Fort Crevier, Kinguan, El Hind, and Jalapadma, all British.
Van der Heyden, General Van der Sweiten and the Tenoba all Dutch, Iran and Norse Trader
were Panamanian, the Rod El Farag for Egypt and finally the Norwegian Graciosa. In all some 50,000 tons of shipping
was destroyed with a further 50,000 tons severely damaged. Of the Fort Stikine's
Officers and crew, Captain Naismith, Chief Officer
Henderson and Alexander Jopp the Second Cook lost their lives, the
remainder miraculously survived. Within seven months the Docks in Bombay
was back
in operation and it was estimated that up to 8,000 men had been
involved in the clean up project including troops from Britain, West
Africa and
India itself.
Damage to railroad cars
[3]
Damaged warehouse and railroad cars
[3]
The remains of Fort Stikine
[3]
Wreckage with fires still burning
[4]
Distant view of a blown-up ship
[4]
Another view said to show the remains of Fort Stikine
[5]
On the 28th of October the authorities began to flood the basin at a
rate of 3ft for each tide, this allowed the salvageable ships to
re-float
at a gradual rate and also allowed the repair crews to repair leaks
as and when they were located. It took forty eight hours to complete the
operation and four days later the docks were back in normal use.
Three hundred acres around the docks had been cleared using bulldozers,
grabs, cranes and bare hands. Three hundred and fifty Lorries a day
made four round trips to Sewree carrying 3,500 tons of debris, the total
amount transported exceeded 800,000 tons.
George Todd's Account
In 1973 a reporter from the British Colombia newspaper Cowichan Valley Citizen
interviewed George Todd. The story was reported in
the newspaper in 2014 in two installments. I have reproduced the text
of the article in full below. It should be noted that the article
includes
the wrong date for the eventsl Part 1
The world was at war. The Normandy landings were imminent as was,
half a world away, the invasion of Japanese-occupied Singapore.
In Bombay (Mumbai) Harbour dozens of ships were undergoing refitting
and loading and discharging of vital materials. One of the men in
charge of the refitting program was 26-year-old George Todd, who
recounted his wartime experiences for me in Victoria in 1973.
He vividly recalled that April 19th when he went to work as foreman
shipwright for the P. & O. Company's Mazagaon Dock Ltd., in charge
of the Prince and Victoria docks. "There would have been 40-50
Liberty ships out in the bay, carrying gas and explosives and troops,
and that sort of thing, for the invasion of Singapore."
Among his personal responsibilities as senior civilian official for the shipyard were the ships Fort Stikine, Jalapadma, Baroda
and El Hind. All went normally until he returned from lunch at 1:30. Going to his office near the Yellow Gate, he was
informed that fire had broken out aboard Fort Stikine, berthed at a slip that separated the two docks.
"It was such a stupid thing, you know, when I look back at it..."
Seated in his living room, he shook his head at the 30-year-old
memory of the resulting disaster which, in a few terrifying seconds,
levelled most of Bombay Harbour, claimed an estimated 800 lives
and injured 3,000 people.
"Quite often, fires break out aboard ships. So I went and inquired about the fire aboard the Fort Stikine
and was told
it had been caused by internal combustion. She had a bad loading
plan - barrels, oil, wood and cotton in the same hold sticks out in
my memory - and the fire was on the port side of the after end of
Number 2 hatch, 'tween decks. The plates got red hot just below the
main deck - you could stand on the wharf and feel the heat. "But we
were not alarmed at this time."
However, in the course of his duties, such as overseeing the final refitting of the pilgrim ship El Hind
to a troopship,
Mr. Todd kept checking to see what was happening. For the next five
hours he heard rumours that the Stikine was also carrying explosives,
a cargo of which, if correct, he should have been informed of
earlier. Finally, at 3 o'clock, after the fire in the ship's hold had
become serious, he was officially notified of the lethal nature of
the ship's main cargo, although the reason for her being in Bombay
was to discharge gold bullion - two million pounds' worth. But few
in Bombay Harbour could have been aware of the extent of her manifest:
Packed into her holds were 2,000 tons of shells, torpedoes, mines,
signal rockets, magnesium flares and incendiary bombs!
By 3 o'clock that afternoon, the fire aboard the Fort Stikine
was growing in intensity, Mr. Todd recalling, "You
could see the shell, or hull, at the after end of Number 2 hold,
starting to get completely red hot. The fire brigade and their gear
had done absolutely no good and it had become necessary for someone
to make a decision. I'd have scuttled the ship."
Frustrated in their efforts to cut through the hull to reach the
heart of the blaze, firefighters had called for reinforcements from
Mr. Todd's men, a squad of shipwrights arriving with acetylene
burning equipment as the clock ticked toward the fateful moment of the
first explosion.
"The last time I talked to Capt. Martensz, the acting deputy manager
of the docks, was about 20 minutes to 4 - 20 minutes before the first
explosion occurred. I had begun to evacuate all my men at 3:30 after
talking to him and deciding the ship was likely to explode."
Continuing along the docks to where the S.S. El Hind was berthed, three slips away from the Fort Stikine,
Mr. Todd was speaking to ship's chief engineer when all hell broke
loose. "I just had time to say, 'It doesn't look to me like she's
going to blow up,' when we saw 20-30 Indian firemen dive over the
side and - Whoosh! - they were shot up suddenly, 300 feet in the air!
The flame was spectacular - nine feet in diameter and bluish-yellow.
"We were like spectators - it was long enough for us to observe this
flame quite clearly, when all of the harbour mud came up from the
bottom and all of the firemen were killed. For a few minutes after
the explosion, there wasn't a sound - then explosion and fire
everywhere. And from then on life was pure misery."
At the moment of the first, smaller explosion, Mr. Todd was standing on the El Hind's
shelter deck, the immediate
concussion blowing him through a cabin door and singeing most of the
skin on his chest and shoulder. Trapped in the artificial
storm unleashed by the detonating Fort Stikine, the El Hind bucked and snapped at her mooring lines.
Then, caught in a giant vortex, she began to slide toward the blazing Fort Stikine!
"We sort of all got together by the fiddley [entrance to the boiler
room] and had a sort of conflab," said Mr. Todd. The shaken and
battered seamen, soldiers and civilians were still debating their
course of action when, some five minutes after the blast, the
El Hind burst into flame, at which they decided to lower the lifeboats - many of which were also ablaze.
"The second explosion came as such a surprise...the dock bottom came
up again and I landed on the main deck, about 30 feet below. There
was debris falling, water, mud and all sorts of things peppered you
from all over the place, and it was pitch black. [Later, doctors
would remove 70 wood and steel splinters from his body.] "There was
all this water around me and I was so shocked that it was not
until I made a move that I realized that I was breathing. I was
quite a good swimmer and decided to swim for it. That was one of the
few times that I really prayed to God and thanked God I was alive."
Part 2
Almost buried alive by debris, Mr. Todd was convinced that the El Hind
had capsized and that he was under water! He was
about to begin swimming when he noticed "a pinhole of light - the
sun - and realized that I was right side up. If I remember correctly,
another couple of guys had tried putting a lifeboat fire out when
the second explosion put the boat on top of them, splitting one man's
side open. We all got on the boat deck, where quite a bunch of us
released him and got him to the fiddley, I think - I forget exactly..."
Once again clustered about the entrance to the boiler room, the
ragged survivors were convinced that the end had come. As most were
injured,
the fires aboard the El Hind increasing in intensity, "we couldn't see much chance of getting out. Some chaps were in a
really bad state, one had a broken spine, the chap from the boat had stomach damage."
Just then, someone made a cheering discovery in one of the ship's
cabins: cigarettes and some water. Refreshed by a smoke and drink, the
survivors again debated their course of action although the
situation, according to Mr. Todd, "looked pretty desperate - in fact, it
seemed impossible. It was the cotton season and the docks were a
blazing inferno of cotton bales. The Jalapadma had been
blown out of the water. She was full of explosives which were
popping off. "We were huddling under the deck, wondering what to do,
when
a landing craft bumped alongside."
The drifting craft came as the answer to their prayers, and they
were quick to throw a rope ladder over the ship's side. Then the two
dozen or so survivors, including the seriously injured, boarded the
craft and, started its engine and navigated their way through the
debris-choked harbour, miraculously fleeing through the Red Gate and
towards the city.
The sight which greeted him as he stumbled through the dockyard gate
remained indelibly impressed upon his memory, 30 years later. With
a "hissing inferno" all about him, needled with more than 70 slivers
of metal and wood, he'd staggered through the gate, to be met by
thousands of troops lined up in formation, awaiting orders to fight
the fire.
As it turned out, they had quite a wait as "it was quite a while
before anyone could get in - some things continued to burn for three
months"!
As for Mr. Todd, he was hospitalized for two weeks, when he returned
to work. His initial duty proved to be a gruesome one, identifying
some of the dead. Making his way from the charred, ruptured remains
of one ship after another, he attempted to identify human remains,
most of which had been reduced to little more than lumps of ash and
were identifiable only by their dog tags. Then, that hideous task
completed, he was able to turn his attention to repairing the
harbour by pumping out the dry docks and overhauling those ships worth
salvaging.
"A complete DEMS gun mount from the Fort Stikine's stern was blown one and a-half mile away, there were anchors and things
blown all over the place. Only a small amount of the Fort Stikine was left, the Jalapadma, the famous
Scandia Company's biggest ship, which had been berthed 50 feet astern of the Fort Stikine,
was blown on top of the dock.
She was 500 feet long, about 12,000 tons and fully loaded. The army
cut off her bow section and let it drop, then cut up the rest and
hauled it away in trucks.
"The Baroda, which had been in the west berth to the Jalapadma, was towed out and sunk. As for the
El Hind, we fixed her up as a merchant ship, eventually. About a dozen other ships in the harbour were destroyed and
had to be towed out and sunk."
According to the records, the Allies lost 35,000 tons of precious
shipping in Bombay Harbour. Not to mention the loss of 800 lives and
3,000 injured.
Describing the cotton bales from the Persian Gulf as being three
times the size of a bale of peat moss, Mr. Todd recalled that they'd
been stacked two bales high and covered the docks for acres. These
had continued to burn for weeks. Fortunately, most of the warehouses
were built of stone and, loaded with food stores, survived almost
intact. But it was a full seven months before the harbour resumed
full operation. "When we drained the harbour, we found quite a few
things in the mud: dead oxen [used to move 60 per cent of all goods],
and almost all the gold bullion [two million pounds' worth] which
had been aboard the Fort Stikine."
Much of the residential district, immediately adjacent to the
harbour, mostly comprised of stuccoed houses, had been destroyed also.
Mr. Todd marvelled at the memory of burning "sulphur all over the
place...About June 14, the monsoon started but the sulphur seemed
to thrive on water - it took almost three months to completely put
the fires out. We didn't have a heck of a lot to work with; it was
unbelievable what was devastated."
For years after the devastating explosion of the Fort Stikine,
Mr. Todd could feel slivers of wood working their way
out of his knee, and bits of stone beneath the skin. It had been, to
say the least, a memorable event of a career as shipwright which
began at the Sir William Gray Shipyard in West Hartlepool. He'd gone
on to become a ship's carpenter in Calcutta and serve in the Royal
Navy Reserve, for a time sailing on an armed merchant cruiser
between England and South Africa. Prior to the Fort Stikine
disaster, he'd twice survived being bombed and strafed. In 1953 he
and his family left Bombay for Canada. At the time of my interview,
he was a charge-hand at Yarrows Shipyard.
A superstitious seaman had predicted that the two-year-old Prince Rupert-built Fort Stikine
would be unlucky after he
watched her during her trials. While proceeding to Vancouver, she'd
been rammed by an American ship and had to return to Prince Rupert
for repairs. Then, loaded with 2,000 tons of explosives, she was off
to Bombay and disaster.
The Indian Government declared April 14th as Fire Service Day in commemoration of the Fort Stikine explosion and the large
loss of life by the fire services and Fire Service Week has been observed there nation-wide every year.
Wreaths laid during the annual ceremony at the memorial in 2014
[2]
Memorials
Fire Service Memorial
A memorial was erected to members of the Fire Service lost in Bombay outside the Fire Service HQ in Byculla.
Memorial at Byculla
[1]
The memorial carries the following inscription:
"Erected by Public Subscription in sacred memory of The Officers
and Men of the Bombay Fire Services who lost their lives in the Bombay
Dock
explosions while on duty on 14th April 1944"
At the base of the plinth is a scene which depicts firemen working and rescuing people at the Docks.
The table below lists the members of the Bombay Fire Service that
lost their lives fighting the fires resulting from the explosions.
Name
Designation
Name
Designation
Harold Palmer
Asstt. Officer Commanding
Bhagchand Balamsingh
Fireman
Robert Chargers G. Andrews
Company Officer
Laxman Dhondu Shinde
Fireman
Arthur D. Reynolds
Company Officer
Sitaram Dhondu Lad
Fireman
Rustom Phirozshah Palamcoat
Station Officer
Raoji Vasudeo Uraskar
Fireman
Rajaram Meghashyam Chavan
Auxiliary Officer
Krishna Jagannath Desai
Fireman
Samuel Thomson
Auxiliary Officer
Shrirang Anant Chavan
Fireman
Mirza Muzaffer Baig
Auxiliary Officer
Chandru Gunaji Chavan
Fireman
Ferdinand Roberts
Auxiliary Officer
Dinkar Vishram Shelar
Fireman
Aron Joseph Days
Auxiliary Officer
Babaji Keshav Bhosle
Fireman
Jodah Salomon Mendrekar
Motor Mechanic
Krishna Shankar Pednekar
Fireman
Shekhar Bangera
Section Leader
Ankush Bhagwan Kadu
Fireman
Yekar Mahabal Shetty
Section Leader
Ramchandra Yeshwant Tawde
Fireman
Daniel Hamilton Thomas
Section Leader
Tukaram Vithoji Surve
Fireman
Nana Sakharam Mulekar
Section Leader
Vithal Sakharam Shinde
Fireman
Mahadeo Shripat Bhosle
Section Leader
Abaji Jagatrao Palande
Fireman
Shivanand Gajanan Pansare
Sub Leader
Ramchandra Narayan Sawant
Fireman
Annaji Balwant Tawre
Sub Leader
Shantaram Balaji Sawant
Fireman
Dattaram Balwant Mahadik
Sub Leader
Maruti Balaji Chavan
Fireman
Kedar Allabux Inamdar
Sub Leader
Bhagwan Balaji Tirvenkar
Fireman
Atmaram Bhiwa Parab
Sub Leader
Ranu Kondiram Suryawanshi
Fireman
Sakharam Tukaram Pawar
Sub Leader
Yeshwant Sadashiv Vichare
Fireman
Madhusudan Sabaji Khot
Sub Leader
Dattatray Vishnu Girkar
Fireman
Saskharam Pandurang Etkar
Sub Leader
Shankar Raoji Jadhav
Fireman
Sakharam Ramji Shirke
Tandel
Khashaba Laxman Surve
Fireman
Damji Mahipat Chavan
Tandel
Vishnu Raoji Kadam
Fireman
Narayan Anant More
Motor Driver
Govind Dhonduji Surve
Fireman
Mohammed Sidhik Alladata
Motor Driver
Yeshwant Mahadev Ghag
Fireman
Yeshwant Gopal Malusare
Motor Driver
Annaji Vithu Satam
Fireman
Keshav Purushottam Godbole
Motor Driver
Ramchandra Laxman Jadhav
Fireman
Dhondu Ramchandra Kalingan
Motor Driver
Nandaji Narayan Shinde
Fireman
Gora Rehmtullah
Motor Driver
Bhanudas Krishnaji Koyande
Fireman
Pandurang Bapu Sawant
Motor Driver
Shankar Sitaram Palkar
Fireman
Shrikrishna Vishnu Apte
Motor Driver
Sk.Abbas Sk.Esmail
Fireman
Tower Hill Memorial - Fort Stikine
The Commonwealth War Grave Commission database includes details of four people killed on Fort Stikine.
Of these only the body of Fireman/Trimmer
Thomas Sweeney of Liverpool was recovered. No trace of the Chief
Officer William Douglas Henderson, Cook Alexander Keith Jupp and Master
Alexander
James Naismith were ever found and they appear on the Tower Hill
memorial.
The Commonwealth War Grave Commission database includes details of just one person lost on Baroda - Cheif Engineer Officer James Stewart.
His body was not found and he is also commemorated on the Tower Hill Memorial
The Commonwealth War Grave Commission database includes details of just one person lost on Baroda - Chief Engineer Officer James Stewart.
His body was not found and he is also commemorated on the Tower Hill Memorial
The Commonwealth War Grave Commission database includes details of four people lost on Jalapadma.
The bodies of Fireman Muhammad
Jamal and Butcher's Mate Manuel Pinto were recovered but there was no
trace of Chief Engineer Officer Randolph Francis David Campbell or
Master
Frank Thomas Withers Lewis and the latter are commemorated on the
Tower Hill Memorial
The Commonwealth War Grave Commission database includes details of just one person lost on Kingyan - Third Officer
Bruno Albert Reinhold Gunther. His body was not found and he is also commemorated on the Tower Hill Memorial
The Mumbai Mirror newspaper carried the following report on 2 February 2011:
HISTORIC GOLD WAS FOUND IN GARBAGE
Mumbai collector to eventually decide ownership of the gold retrieved from 3000 cubic metres of silt
It was sheer, blind luck that led labourers to recover two gold bars, lost at sea during one of Mumbai's most dramatic
tragedies 67 years ago, from more than 3000 metric cubes of garbage. The gold was part of a the cargo on board the SS
Fort Stikine, which exploded in the Mumbai docks on April 14, 1944, resulting in the loss of 700 lives as fires raged
for three full days.
At around 8 pm on Monday, workers from dredger Sulawesi II
of Jaisu Shipping — a company that's been working with
Gammon India on the Offshore Container Terminal Project since April
2009 — were preparing to go for their next dig after having
dropped their previous load of sandsilt into the port dumping
ground. As per the normal routine, they were cleaning the hopper, a
container in which silt is collected, when they noticed two shiny
objects wedged inside its steel plates.
"They took them out, first thinking they were pieces of scrap metal.
However when they cleaned them up, they were stunned to find
that they were gold bars. "It could've easily been lost in the dump
yard but had somehow managed to stay cling on to the machine,"
a port official told Mumbai Mirror.
The workers immediately informed the Master on board the dredger,
who in turn told higher authorities in the company, and handed
over the bars to them. "The officials were stunned to have struck
gold in such an unexpected manner, but deemed it fit to inform
the authorities. The port officials and the police were contacted,
and the gold bars examined. When they realised that this was the
same spot where the SS Fort Stikine had gone down, it was inferred that it was gold must be from the same lot,"
the official added.
The gold bars were on Tuesday deposited with the Yellow Gate police
station, where they have been kept under the Treasure Trove
Act. Police said the gold will now be sent to the Mumbai Collector,
who will decide its ownership and the reward, if any, to the
labourers who found it. A fullfledged dredging of the area was
launched on Tuesday to find if there is any more gold hidden in
the sea bed, but no more was found. The project manager of Jaisu
Shipping, Vishal Jain, was not available for comment.
"It has been confirmed that gold dates back to the time when SS Fort Stikine
was destroyed in an explosion near
Victoria dock," DCP (Port Zone), Quaisar Khalid, said. The twin
explosions in 1944 had destroyed a total of 28 ships parked in the
harbour at the time, and bars of gold had fallen on the roads, some
found in places as far as St Xavier's College in Dhobitalao.
The gold on board the Fort Stikine was valued back then at anything between one million and two million pounds.
When such bars were found in the past - the last somewhere in the 60s - they were all returned to the UK government.
Gold found in dredger
[6]
Front page of Mumbai Mirror 1 February 2011
[6]
Mumbai Police Officer holding the recovered gold
[6]
Fort Stikine was a cargo ship that first came to my attention when I was constructing the
Benjidog Tower Hill website. I noticed that the WW2 memorial to those with "No grave but the sea"
contained several panels for ships that had met their fate due to the explosion of Fort Stikine.
Recently I came across information
that I had not seen before whilst working on re-publication of
material from the MerchantNavyOfficers.com website that closed down a
couple of years ago
on the death of its owner and this inspired me to create this page.
The 'Fort' ships were a class of 198 cargo ships built in Canada
during WW2 for use by the United Kingdom under the Lend-Lease scheme.
They all had
names prefixed with 'Fort' when built. The ships were in service
between 1942 and 1985 with two still listed on shipping registers in
1992. They were built
at eighteen different Canadian shipyards and there were three
variations of the basic design. The North Sands type were of riveted construction and
the Canadian and Victory types were of welded construction. I presume that Fort Stikine
belonged to one of the latter
two subclasses but have been unable to discover which. The vessel was
named after a historic fort and fur trade post whose site is now
occupied by
Wrangell in Alaska. The Stikine river had been a route to the
Klondike during the 'Gold Rush'.
The destruction and death caused by the explosion on Fort Stikine
resulted mainly from bad practice in the mix and stowage of cargo.
It is easy to say this in hindsight, but too many corners were cut in
desperation during the war and blame should not be attributed to the
Captain and
crew who, when they raised objections, were told in no uncertain
terms to "Shut up and get on with it" with the addition of the commonly
used phrase
"Don't you know there is a war on?"
To me the most inspiring aspect of this story is the courage of
the crew and the local fire brigade in trying to bring under control
the fire that led to the eventual destruction of several ships and a
large area of the harbour. In colloquial terms, put in their shoes,
"you wouldn't have seen my arse for dust" when the fire started
knowing what the cargo consisted of. Many of these brave men died. As a
mark of respect I
have included below the names of the members of the Fire Service that
lost their lives as well as merchant seamen. Fort Stikine
[9]
Fort Stikine took part in 41 convoys and many
independent voyages during WW2 according to information shown in the
table below which is provided courtesy
of Convoyweb - see External. Ref. #4.
Fort Stikine was destroyed in at least two terrible explosions.
There follows a newsreel video and a number of accounts of what happened
from different sources. Note: I have not checked these accounts for accuracy and republish them with only minor changes to
standardise the presentation style.
Newsreel
The link below should enable you to see a short contemporary
newsreel from Universal Pictures in the USA. Click on the little square
box to the right of the controls to enlarge the view. The remains of Fort Stikine [3] Damage
The chaos and lack of organisation which had occurred aboard Stikine extended beyond and hampered the efforts of those who now found themselves fighting the fires within the immediate dock area. A typical example occurred when Army Officers marched into a brigade station and requisitioned the remaining pumps, handed them over to inexperienced soldiers and left 68 firemen with no means of fighting anything. The area of fire extended out from the epicentre by approximately 900 yards and included all of Victoria and Princess Docks, the Godown estate to the West, the Burmah Oil installation to the North and the Rice Market to the South. On the Western side it had gone beyond the Godowns and had set fire to many of the dwellings of the poorer natives who lived on the fringes of the city proper. It took four more days to extinguish the main fire and for a further two weeks smaller fires continued to smolder in the ruins.
231 people were killed attached to the various services which included the fire brigade and dock employee's, another 476 were injured. Outside the docks over 500 civilians were killed and a further 2,408 were injured. Thirteen ships were lost, Fort Stikine, Baroda, Fort Crevier,Kinguan, El Hind, and Jalapadma, all British. Van der Heyden, General Van der Sweiten and the Tenoba all Dutch, Iran and Norse Trader were Panamanian, the Rod El Farag for Egypt and finally the Norwegian Graciosa. In all some 50,000 tons of shipping was destroyed with a further 50,000 tons severely damaged. Of the Stikine's Officers and crew, Captain Naismith, Chief Officer Henderson and Alexander Jopp the Second Cook lost their lives, the remainder miraculously survived. Within seven months the Docks in Bombay was back in operation and it was estimated that up to 8,000 men had been involved in the clean up project including troops from Britain, West Africa and India itself.
... Bombay Harbor Fire" On April 14, 1944, in the Victoria Dock of Bombay (now ... the ship's captain .
The following tribute appears on a plaque situated on the left of the Memorial.
"Erected by Public Subscription
in sacred memory of
The Officers and Men of the Bombay Fire Services
who lost their lives in the Bombay Dock explosions
while on duty on 14th April 1944"
At the base of the plinth is a scene which depicts firemen working and rescuing people at the Docks. ......................................................................................................
Remembering the day a 'floating bomb' brought death and destruction to Bombay
A series of grave omissions in 1944 led to the tragedy that is now called Bombay Dock Explosion.
Wikimedia Commons
Seventy-one years ago, on April 14, two explosions rocked
Bombay Harbour, raining death and destruction on the docks and the area
around it. An estimated 800 people were killed in those explosions,
thousands were driven from their homes, and the city's waterfront was
left in a shambles.
In a letter dated April 18, 1944, Indira
Gandhi described the explosions to her father from the hill station of
Matheran, over 80 km away. It was afternoon and she was reading a book
when the building began shaking and the windows and doors rattling. The
rumbling stopped for a few minutes before beginning again, leading her
to assume it was an earthquake. She noted the time of the first
explosion at a few minutes past 4 pm. The letter, included in the book Two Alone, Two Together, also tells us that there was no mail or newspaper the next day and she was certain that Nehru knew what had happened.
But,
in fact, information was heavily curtailed at that time. The Second
World War had entered its last decisive stage and the censors checked
everything. It was later that Radio Saigon, a Japanese-controlled radio
station, revealed what really happened. A ship called the Fort Stikine,
loaded with explosives and cotton, was responsible for the event that is
now called the Bombay Explosion.
The
Fort Stikine was a huge Canadian-built steamship that sailed from
England on February 24 loaded with Royal Air Force planes, ammunition,
explosives and other stores. It also had many wooden crates, each
containing four bars of gold. Each bar weighed 28 pounds and the gold,
worth £2 million, was being sold by the Bank of England to the Indian
Government to help stabilise the Indian rupee, since much of it had gone
to finance the Indian colony’s war effort. The explosives contained in
the ship weighed around 1,395 tonnes and included shells, torpedoes,
mines, rockets and incendiary bombs.
The ship travelled in a
convoy through the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea
before docking at Karachi a month later. It was here that more than
8,000 bales of hessian-wrapped raw cotton, hundreds of drums of
lubricating oil, scrap iron, timber, sulphur, rice, fish manure and
resin were loaded onto it. The cotton was stored one level below the
dynamite – cotton bales were prone to combustion but the ship’s
officials seemed oblivious to this fact. As the Fort Stikine sailed
onward to Bombay, it was already a “floating bomb”, a bomb with a fuse
lit. The ship did not carry the danger flag though it was war time and
this would have alerted the enemy.
When the Stikine finally
reached the Victoria Docks on April 12, there were 11 other ships
already berthed. The unloading work, especially of the cotton bales, was
not commenced immediately. Other omissions that would prove lethal
ranged from the incautious to the farcical.
The impact
A
fire in the ship’s hold was first noticed at 12.30 pm. A fire officer
realised that a blaze on a ship carrying explosives called for a
distinct alarm, but the only telephone he found was damaged. More things
went wrong. When he finally broke the glass of a fire alarm, the
control room personnel read it as a normal call and deputed only two
pumps. By then two hours had already elapsed. A way out was to scuttle
or drown the ship, but the ship’s captain, its chief engineer and the
manager in charge of the docks disagreed. The chief engineer indicated
that the ship could not be sunk by flooding its holds as the valves were
designed to let out water, and not to allow any water in.
The
ship was destined to blow up. Sixty or more firefighters tried to put
out the blaze with hoses throughout the afternoon. Nothing helped. The
deck floor heated up under their feet but the water just wouldn’t reach
into the ship’s hold. The firemen stood in burning water, refusing to
give up the fight even when they were ordered off the ship.
Soon
after the explosives caught fire and, at 4.07 pm, a massive explosion
rocked the bay area. The blast flung out men on board, along with hot
metal pieces large enough to slice anyone into pieces. Oil casks with
fire shooting from all sides rose high into the air, as did cotton
bales. This deadly cargo fell down on neighbouring ships, setting them
afire, as well as the warehouses and other buildings on the docks. The
Stikine was lifted up 3,000 feet. The first explosion resounded all
across Bombay and beyond. The impact appeared on the seismographs
located in faraway Shimla. The second explosion came half an hour later,
when twice the number of explosives blew up, wreaking even more damage
than the first.
The Aftermath
As it was
wartime, censorship rules meant news reporters in British India could
file their reports only in the second week of May 1944. Film of the
explosions and its aftermath shot by Indian cinematographer Sudhish
Ghatak, a cousin of Ritwik Ghatak, was confiscated by military officers.
Parts of it were shown to the public as a newsreel only much later.
All
27 ships in the two docks, Victoria and Prince, were sunk, burnt out or
badly damaged in the episode, and all dock buildings were reduced to
rubble. Fires broke out all over the port, causing other small blasts.
Fragments of blazing steel, sometimes weighing up to 100 tonnes, flew at
incredible speed, bringing more death and destruction. Author Jerry
Pinto writes of a horse being decapitated as it trotted down a street in
panic. All hell broke loose in Bombay that day.
The official
toll was 740 dead, including 476 military people, and around 1,800
people injured. Unofficial tallies were much higher. It is never known
just how many people living in the nearby slums died. Many families lost
all their belongings and thousands became destitute. It was estimated
that around 6,000 firms were affected and several thousand lost their
jobs. The government paid compensation to citizens who made a claim for
loss or damage to property.
It took three days and more for
military troops to fight the raging fires. Some buildings were
demolished to stop it from spreading. The Gateway of India, it was said,
could have crumbled too, like other buildings nearer the scene of the
explosion. Photographs show a railroad yard littered with debris and
shattered wagons. Over the next three months, many ships were salvaged.
Later some 8,000 men worked for seven months to remove the thousands of
tonnes of debris to make the docks operational again.
The many
crates of gold either disintegrated, melted or just sank. Some gold
bars, in stories that have become legend, flew high in the air, with oil
kegs, cotton bales and even landed in people’s homes. A bar of gold
came crashing through the wall in the Girgaum house of a retired Parsi
gentleman. When he returned the bar to the police, he was rewarded a sum
of Rs 999, which he donated to the Relief Fund. Normal dredging
operations at the docks continued to yield intact gold bars
periodically, even as late as February 2011. A 45-kilogram shell that
had yet to detonate was found on October 2011.
Since the
explosion was mysterious in some ways, especially in its immediacy, it
gave rise to many myths. One of them came from the fact that the Stikine
had exploded exactly 22 years to the day the Titanic had sunk. Another
myth revolved around one of India’s most popular and enduring products:
The contents of the Godrej safes storing deposits of many banks remained
undamaged.
As Bombay Explosion occurred during the World War II,
some initially claimed that the explosion was caused by Japanese
sabotage. But subsequent inquiries would reveal it was a tragic
accident, one caused by several unintentional omissions. At the city
fire brigade’s headquarters in Byculla, a memorial honours the 66
fighters who perished fighting the blaze. Fire Safety Week is observed
all over Maharashtra from April 14 to 21 in memory of those brave
firemen.
Thanks for this site. My father was with the RAF stationed at Sion Bombay when the explosion occurred. He was drafted into a working party at the docks. Their job was to empty warehouses of ammunition and dump it in the water of the docks. As the fire spread from warehouse to warehouse they had to abandon each in turn. They could feel the heat of the blazing adjoining warehouse through the stone walls. They met one British NCO who was distraught because his party had been engulfed by a collapsing warehouse and all lost. Near exhaustion, they were allowed to rest in the Bombay yacht clubhouse. The building was expected to be overtaken by the fire and so they were allowed to help themselves to cigarettes and sweets from the bar.
A huge tidal wave swept across the dock and ripped ships from their moorings, one ship finished atop a warehouse.
EXPLOSION IN BOMBAY
1 comment:
Thanks for this site. My father was with the RAF stationed at Sion Bombay when the explosion occurred. He was drafted into a working party at the docks. Their job was to empty warehouses of ammunition and dump it in the water of the docks. As the fire spread from warehouse to warehouse they had to abandon each in turn. They could feel the heat of the blazing adjoining warehouse through the stone walls. They met one British NCO who was distraught because his party had been engulfed by a collapsing warehouse and all lost.
Near exhaustion, they were allowed to rest in the Bombay yacht clubhouse. The building was expected to be overtaken by the fire and so they were allowed to help themselves to cigarettes and sweets from the bar.
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