Monday, September 5, 2011

History of Bombay city[1670 ONWARDS] under Maratha;Mughal;siddi; Portuguese and English rule

                        THE MARATHAS. 1670-1800.
Of the state of the district between 1673 and 1675, Fryer has left several interesting details.

Under the great Gerald Aungier, the Euglish were founding a marine, fortifying Bombay, bringing the settlement into order, and making the island an asylum for (traders and craftsmen; but trade was small and the climate was deadly.
  Weavers came from Chaul to Bombay, and a street was ordered to be built for them stretching from the customs-house to the fort.
 Ditto, In 1669 Mr. Warwieh Pett was sent to Bombay to instruct the settlers in ship-building (Ditto, II. 254).]
 In Salsette and Bassein the Portuguese were ' effeminated in courage'; they kept their lands only because they lived among mean-spirited neighbours. [Fryer's New Account, 64; Baldseus in Churchill, III. 546; Chardin in Orme'a Hist. Frag. 220.] Still Salsette was rich, with pleasant villages and country seats, the ground excellent either of itself or by the care of its inhabitants, yielding fine cabbages, coleworts and radishes, garden fruit, ' uncomparable' water-melons, and onions as sweet and well-tasted as an apple. Salsette supplied with provisions not only the adjoining islands but Goa also.
 Every half mile, along the Bassein creek from Thana to Bassein, were ' delicate'' country mansions.
In Bandra the Jesuits lived in a great college with much splendour. Rural churches were scattered over the island, and Thana and Bandra were considerable towns. [ New Account, 70-73.]
 Bassein was a great city with six churches, four convents, and two colleges, and stately dwellings graced with covered balconies and large two-storied windows. The land was plain and fruitful in sugarcane, rice, and other grain.
 Much of it had lately been destroyed by the Arabs of Maskat, who, without resistance, often set fire to the Portuguese villages, carried off their gentry into slavery, butchered their priests, and robbed their churches. Every year the Portuguese had a ' lusty' squadron at sea, but no sooner was the squadron passed than the Arabs landed and worked mischief. [Fryer's New Accout ', 75.

 Orme (Hist. Frag. 46) states that the Arabs numbered 600, fewer than the Bassein garrison, but the garrison remained panic-struck within their walls. This pusillanimity, adds Orme, exposed them to the contempt of all their neighbours.
 In 1670 the Arabs had seized and sacked Diu. Hamilton's New Account, 1. 139. In 1674, according to Chardin, the Arabs were routed at Daman. Orme's Hist. Frag. 218.]
On his way to Junnar in Poona, in April 1675,
 Fryer found, on both sides of the Kalyan river, stately villages and dwellings of Portuguese nobles, till, on the right, about a mile from Kalyan, they yielded to Shivaji.

 Kalyan was destroyed by the fury of the Portugals, afterwards of the Moghal, then of Shivaji, and now lately of the Moghal whose flames were hardly extinguished. By these incursions the town was so ruined that the houses were mean kennels and the people beggars. [Fryer's New Account, 124.]
Titvala, seven miles east, across rocky barren and parched ways, was, like Kalyan, reeking in ashes. The Moghals laid waste all in their road, both villages, fodder, and corn, carrying off cattle and women and children for slaves, and burning the woods so that runaways might have no shelter. Then the way led across some better country, with arable grounds, heaths,- and forests, some of them on fire for two or three miles together.
 In the poor village of Murbad, where Fryer next stopped, the people had no provisions. Though several villages were in sight and the people greedy enough to take money, with diligent search and much ado, only one hen was found. All the land was ploughed, but Shivaji coming reaped the harvest, leaving the tillers hardly enough to keep body and soul together.
 From Murbad the path led over hilly, but none of the worst ways, across burnt grass-lands ; then over a fine meadow checkered with brooks and thriving villages, to the foot of the hills, to Dehir (Dhasai), a garrison town of Shivaji's, where he stabled his choicest horses. Here all were in arms, not suffering their women to stir out of the town. The town was crowded with people miserably poor. The garrison was a ragged regiment, their weapons more a cause of laughter than of terror. [Fryer's New Account, 127.]
On his return from Junnar (May 24th), Fryer came by the Nana pass through Murbad and Barfta, perhaps Barvi about three miles north-east of Kalyan.
 The misery of the people seems to have struck him even more than on his way inland. His bearers could buy nothing, the people being 'harried out of their wits,' mistrusting their own countrymen as well as strangers, living as it were wildly, betaking themselves to the thickets and wildernesses among the hills upon the approach of any new face.
 At Barfta the ' Coombies or woodmen/ who lived in beehive-like huts lined with broad teak leaves, were not strong enough to aid their herds against the devouring jaws of wild beasts. Fires had to be kept up, lest the horse might ' lose one of his quarters or the oxen serve the wild beasts for a supper,' A strict watch was added, whose mutual answerings in a high tone were deafened by the roaring of tigers, the cries of jackals, and the yellings of baloos or overgrown wolves. The poor Coombies were all so harassed that they dared not till the ground, never expecting to reap what they sowed. Nor did they remain in their houses, but sought lurking places in deserts and caverns. So obvious were the hardships that Fryer's bearers often reflected on their own happiness under English rule. [Fryer's New Account, 142.]
During these years (1673-1677) the relations of the English and Portuguese were still unfriendly. Enraged at the refusal of the Deputy Governor to give up a Malabar ship that had sought refuge in Bombay, the Portuguese General Manuel de Saldanha raised a force of 1200 men and marched against Bombay. But, on finding that this display of strength had no effect, he beat a retreat.
 Shortly after some Portuguese priests were found in Bombay, stirring up the Portuguese residents against the English, and an order was issued requiring 'all vagabond Padres' to leave the island.

 The Portuguese authorities continued to starve Bombay, forbidding the export of rice from Bandra and placing an almost prohibitive duty on fruits, vegetables, and fowls.
They tried to levy a ten per cent duty on all supplies passing Thana and Karanja on their way to Bombay, but this the English steadily resisted. [Brace's Annals, II. 392; Anderson's English in Western India, 86. According to Navarette the English overthrew the churches and cut to pieces the pictures on the altars. Orme's Hist. Frag. 203.]
                                    Shivaji's Conquest 1675-1680.
In 1675 Shivaji drove the Moghals from their Thana possessions, and passing west along the Tansa, began to fortify opposite the Portuguese town of Saivan (Sibon). This produced some 'slender hostilities,' but the work went on. [Orme's Hist. Frag. 51-64.
 Shivaji is stated to have driven the Moghals from Kalyan, which, except the Portuguese strip of coast, included all the country below the hills as far north as Daman. Bruce a Annals, II. 48. Disorder among the Portuguese was one cause of Shivaji's success. In V675 (May 25th) Fryer found at Kalyan ' a pragmatical Portugal who had fled to this place for designing the death of a fidalgo. He was about to accept the pay of Shivaji, and was marching at the head of forty men. He was a bold desperate fellow, a rich lout, no gentleman, a fit instrument to ruin his nation.' New Account, 144.]

In the following year Shivaji sent a force to Parnera in the south of Surat, and repaired and garrisoned the fort. [Orme's Hist. Frag. 55.]
In 1678 Shivaji tried to burn the Musalman boats in Bombay harbour. Failing in his first attempt he went back to Kalyan and tried to cross to Thana, but was stopped by Portuguese boats. [Nairne's Konkan, 67.]
In the same year the Nagothna river was the scene of a struggle between some English troops from Bombay and Shivaji's general.
                                              Shivaji and the Sidis, 1675-1680.
In October 1679, to guard the southern shores of Bombay harbour against the Sidi's raids, Shivaji took possession of the small rocky island of Khanderi or Kenery at the mouth of the harbour.

This island was claimed both by the Portuguese and by the English, but it had been neglected as it was supposed to have no fresh water. On its capture by Shivaji the English and Sidis attempted to turn out the Marathas.
The English sent an aged captain, or according to another account a drunk lieutenant, in a small vessel to find out what the Marathas meant by landing on the island. The officer was induced to land, and he and his crew were cut off. The Revenge, a pink, and seven native craft were ordered to lie at anchor and block all approach to the rock. On this, the Marathas attacked the English fleet, took one grab, and put to flight all except the Revenge. The little man-of-war was commanded by Captain Minchin, and the gallant Captain Keigwin was with him as Commodore. These officers allowed the Marathas to board, and then, sweeping the decks with their great guns, destroyed some hundreds, sunk four of the enemy's vessels, and put the rest to flight. In spite of this success the Marathas continued to hold Khanderi.

 Soon after (9th January 1680), as a counter movement, Sidi Kasim entrenched himself on Underi or Henery rock, about two miles to the east of Khanderi,
and the Marathas in vain tried to drive him out.
The possession of these islands by enemies, or, at best, by doubtful friends, imperilled Bombay. 

The Deputy Governor prayed the Court for leave to expel them. In reply he was censured for not having called out the Company's ships and prevented the capture. But, owing to want of funds and the depressed state of trade, he was ordered to make no attempt to recover the islands, and was advised to avoid interference in all wars between Indian powers. An agreement was accordingly made acquiescing in Shivaji s possession of Khanderi.[ Bruce's Annals, II. 447-448; Anderson's English in Western India, 82; Low's Indian Navy, I. 65-69.]
                                                            Sambhaji 1680.
On the death of Shivaji on the 5th of April 1680, Sambhaji, his son and successor, by supporting the Emperor's rebel son Sultan Akbar, brought on himself the anger of Aurangzeb.

In the fights that followed between the Sidis and the Marathas the shores of the Bombay harbour were often ravaged.
The English in Bombay were in constant alarm, as, from ill-advised reductions, they had only one armed ship and less than a hundred Europeans in the garrison[ Nairne's Konkan, 74; Bruce's Annals, II. 489.]
In 1682 a Moghal army came from Junnar to Kalyan.

 The Portuguese had before this lost their hold of Shabaz or Belapur near Panvel,

as the Sidi is mentioned as building a fort at Belapur to guard it against the Marathas.

 After the rains the Marathas and Sidis again fought in Bombay harbour, and Sambhaji is mentioned as preparing to fortify the island of Elephanta and as ordering his admiral Daulat-Khan to invade Bombay, where the militia were embodied and 8000 of Aurangzeb's troops were landed at Mazgaon to help in the defence. [Nairne's Konkan, 74; Bruce's Annals, II. 60.]

1683 the Moghals ravaged Kalyan, and the Portuguese fought with the Marathas. Sambhaji, who was repulsed before Chaul, seized the island of Karanja and plundered some places north of Bassein.
In consequence of the capture of Bantam by the Dutch,

 Bombay was made the head English station in the East Indies, forty European recruits were sent, and 200 Rajputs ordered to be enrolled.

At the close of the year Captain Keigwin, the commandant of the Bombay garrison, enraged by continued reductions in pay and privileges, revolted from the Company, seized and confined the Deputy Governor, and, with the concurrence of the garrison and the people of the island, declared that the island was under the King's protection. Mr. Child, the President, came from Surat to Bombay, but, failing to arouse any feeling in favour of the Company, returned to Surat.
 The revolt continued till October 1684, when Sir Thomas Grantham, a King's officer and "Vice-Admiral of the Indian fleet, arrived from England, and coming to Bombay in November 1684, landed without attendants, and persuaded Keigwin to give up the island and retire to England. [Bruce's Annals, II. 512-541; Anderson's English in Western India, 105.]
 Keigwin had ruled with honesty and success. He made a favourable treaty with Sambhaji and repressed the Sidi, forbidding them to come to Mazgaon except for water. He claimed, perhaps with justice, that his vigorous management had saved the island from falling into the hands either of the Marathas on of the Moghals. [Nairne's Konkan, 74; Brace's Annals, II. 498.]

 In 1681 Kalyan was again ravaged by the Moghals.[Nairne's Konkan, 75.]

 The war between the Portuguese and the Marathas was renewed, the Portuguese retaking Karanja, Santa Cruz opposite Kalyan, and the great hill-fort of Asheri. [Orme's Hist. frag. 141.] Sambhaji in return ravaged the Portuguese territory and invested Bassein. [Nairne's Koakan, 70.]
                                                        Sir John Child, 1687-1690.
In 1687, under the influence of Sir Josiah Child,

Sir Josiah Child

the Court of Directors, disgusted with the uncertain nature of their trading privileges in Surat and in Bengal, full of admiration for the Dutch system of independent and self-supporting centres of trade, and encouraged by the support they received from the Crown, determined to shake off their submission to the Moghal to raise their leading Indian factories to be Regencies, to strengthen them so that they could not be taken by native attack, and to use their power at sea as a means of preventing Aurangzeb from interering with their trade.
With this object independent settlements were to be established at Bombay, Madras, and Chittagong.
Bombay was to be the chief seat of power,
 as strong as art and money could make it, and Salsette was to be seized and garrisoned
. Mr. now Sir John, Child, the brother of Sir Josiah Child, was appointed Captain General and Admiral of the Company's forces by sea and land

He was directed to leave Surat and establish his head-quarters in, Bombay to make an alliance with the Marathas, and to seize as many Moghal ships as he could, until the independence of the Company's stations was acknowledged.
 With this object a strong force both in ships and men was sent to Chittagong and to Bombay. These schemes and preparations failed. In Bengal, hostilities were begun before the whole force arrived; they were prosecuted with little success, and agreements were hurriedly patched up on the old basis of dependance on the Moghal. In the west matters went still worse. Sir John Child issued orders for the capture of Moghal ships while Mr. Har is and the the factors were still at Surat. With these hostages there was no chance that the fear of the destruction of the Moghal sea-trade would induce Aurangzeb to admit the independence of the English settlements. Aurangzeb at this time, besides his successes against Sambhaji, had reduced both Bijapur and Golkonda. The attempt to wring concessions from him was hopeless and had to be given up, and envoys were sent to Bijapur to negotiate a peace and regain the former privileges. In the midst of these disappointments and failures Sir John Child died in Bombay on the 4th of February 1690.
                                                            Bombay, 1690.
On the 27th of February 1690 Aurangzeb passed an order granting the English leave to trade.

 The terms of this order were humiliating. The English had to admit their fault, crave pardon, pay a heavy fine, promise that they would go back to their old position of simple traders, and dismiss Child 'the origin of all the evil.'
 Before this pardon was granted (14th February 1689) the Sidi fleet and army had invaded Bombay, gained possession of Mahim, Mazgaon, and Sion, and held the Governor and the garrison as if besieged in the town and castle. The treaty with the English contained an order to the Sidi to withdraw from Bombay. But the English did not regain possession of Mazgaon, Mahim, and Sion, till the 22nd of June 1690. [Bruce's Annals, II. 550-642.]
                                                         Bombay 1690-1700.
So weak were the defences of the island and so powerless was the garrison, reduced by pestilence to thirty-five English, that, in Mr. Harris' opinion, if it had not been for the jealousy of Mukhtyar Khan the Moghal general, the Sidi might have conquered the island. [Bruce's Annals, III. 94. 

The Jesuits had been active in helping the Sidi. As a punishment their lands in Bombay were seized. Ditto 95.]
 This foolhardy and ill-managed attempt [Anderson's English in Western India, 117.] of the Childs to raise the Company to the position of an independent power is said to have cost the Company £416,000 (Rs. 41,60,000). [Khafi Khan (1680- 1735) seems to have visited Bombay before Sir John Child's troubles began. 
He was much struck by the strength and richness of the place. Elliot and Dowson, VII. 212.] During the decline of Maratha, vigour, that followed the capture and death of Sambhaji, the Moghals overran most of the North Konkan.
 In 1689 they made several inroads into Portuguese territory, plundering small towns and threatening Bassein. [Ovington's Voyage to Surat.]
 In 1690 a band of ruffians, under a leader named Kakaji, came plundering close to Bassein, and two years later the Sidi attacked Bassein and threatened Salsette. [Nairne's Konkan, 77; Bruce's Annals, III, 124.]
In 1694 Aurangzeb declared war on the Portuguese, and his troops ravaged the country so cruelly that the people had to take shelter within the walls of Bassein and Daman.
 Fortunately for the Portuguese Aurangzeb was in want of cannon to use against the Marathas, and, on the promise of a supply, made a favourable treaty with the Portuguese. [Nairne's Konkan, 8.] But there seemed neither rest nor security for the rich peace-loving Portuguese.

 No sooner were mutters settled with Aurangzeb than bands of Maskat Arabs landed in Salsette, burnt the Portuguese villages and churches, killed their priests, and carried off 1400 prisoners into slavery. [Hamilton in Nairne's Konkan, 78. The Arabs of Maskat, had five large ships and 1500 men. 

In 1694 their strength was so great that they were expected to gain command of the Persian gulf. Bruce's Annals, III. 169-198.]

 Next year the Portuguese were somewhat encouraged by, what was now an unusual event, a sea victory over the Marathas.[Nairne's Konkan, 78. Orme notices (Historical Fragments, 218) that as late as 1674 the Portuguese armada cruised every year off Goa to assert the sovereignty of the seas.]
Bombay continued very depressed.

In 1694 trade was in a miserable state; the revenue had fallen from £5208 to £1416 (Rs. 52,0S0-Rs. 14,160),[1£=10 rupees]
the cocoa-palms were almost totally neglected, and there were only a hundred Europeans in the garrison.[Bruce s Annals, III. 164.]
In 1696 want of funds required a reduction of sixty Christians and 340 Gentoos, [Bruce's Annals, III. 194; Anderson's English in Western India, 128.]and,
 in 1697, there were only twenty-seven European soldiers. [ Bruce's Annals, III. 215.]

In 1701 Mahim and other stations had been strengthened, but the garrison was weak. The Marathas, Moors, Arabs, and Portuguese were ready to attack Bombay, and if reinforcements were not sent the island must be lost[Bruce's Annals, III. 439.]
 In 1702 the safety of the island was threatened by the Portuguese stopping the supply of provisions for the garrison, and giving secret help to the Marathas.

Added to this the plague broke out in the island, carried off some-hundreds of the natives, and reduced the Europeans to the small number of seventy-six men.

 The plague was followed by a storm which destroyed the produce of the island and wrecked the greater part of the shipping. [Bruce's Annals, III. 502-503.]

 In 1705 matters were little better. The garrison was very weak, the Hindu companies were disbanded for neglect of duty, the Surat trade was at a stand, and the trade with the Malabar coast was harassed by Kanhoji Angria, a Shivaji, or Maratha robber. [Bruce's Annals, III. 596-597.]

In 1708 the king of Persia proposed to send an envoy to arrange with the English a joint attack on the Maratha and Arab pirates. But the Governor was forced to decline; Bombay was in no state to receive an envoy ' either by the appearance of its strength, or by having disposable shipping for the service solicited.' [Brace's Annals, III. 652.]

 The 'Unfortunate Isle of the East' was plague-stricken, empty, and ruined. Of 800 Europeans only fifty were left, six civilians, six commissioned officers, and not quite forty English soldiers. There was only one horse fit to ride and one pair of oxen able to draw a coach.[Anderson's English in Western India, 128, 163, 171-172.] Bombay that had been one of the pleasantest places in India was brought to be one of the most dismal deserts.[Hamilton's New Account, I. 240.]
                                               Portuguese Thana, 1690-1700.
Between Aurangzeb's treaty with the Portuguese in 1694 and his death in 1708, with the coast strip under the Portuguese and Kalyan under the Moghals, Thana seems to have been freer from war and plunder than it had been for years. Of the parts under the Moghals no details have been traced. But, in spite of all they had suffered, the Portuguese lands were richly tilled, and the people, except the lowest classes, were well-to-do. According to the Musalman historian Khafi Khan, [Khafi Khan's Muntakhabu-I-Lubab in Elliot and Dowson, VII. 211-212, and 345-346. Khafi Khan, who lived from about 1680 to 1735, travelled in the Konkan and visited Bombay. See below p. 485 note 2.] Bassein and Daman were very strong and the villages round them were flourishing, yielding a very large revenue. The Portuguese tilled the skirts of the hills and grew the best crops, sugarcane, pine-apples, and rice, with gardens of cocoa-palms and vast numbers of betel vines.

 Unlike the English, they attacked no ships except ships that refused their passes, or Arab and Maskat vessels with which they were always at war.
  The greatest act of Portuguese tyranny was, that they taught and brought up as Christians the children of any of their Musalman or Hindu subjects who died leaving no grown-up son. [Muntakhabu-I-Lubab in Elliot and Dowson, VII. 345.]
Otherwise they were worthy of praise. They built villages and in all matters acted with much kindness to the people, and did not vex them with oppressive taxes.
 They set apart a quarter for the Musalmans and appointed a kazi to settle all matters of taxes and marriages. Only the call to prayer was not allowed. A poor traveller might pass through their territory and meet with no trouble, except that he would not be able to say his prayers at his ease. Their places of worship were very conspicuous with burning tapers of camphor and figures of the Lord Jesus and Mary, very gaudy in wood, wax, and paint. They were strict in stopping tobacco, and a traveller might not carry more than for his own use. When they married, the girl was given as the dowry. They left the management of all affairs in the house and out of the house to their wives. They had only one wife and concubines were not allowed. [Muntakhabu-I-Lubab in Elliot and Dowson, VII. 2H-212 and 345-346.]
In the beginning of 1695 the Italian traveller Gemelli Careri spent some time at Daman and Bassein, and in Salsette. [Churchill's Voyages, IV. 186-200.]

 Daman was a fairly pretty town in the Italian style. It had three broad streets and four cross streets, lined with regular rows of one-storied tiled dwellings, with oyster-shell windows instead of glass, and each house with its garden of fruit-trees. There were several good monasteries and four modern bastions, well-built though ill-supplied with cannon. There was a good garrison, a captain, and a revenue factor. The people were Portuguese, half-castes or mestizos, Musalmans, and Hindus. Most of the Hindus lived in old Daman on the right bank of the river, a place of ill-planned streets and cottages, with mud. walls and roofs thatched with palm-leaves. The Portuguese lived in great style, with slaves and palanquins.

 [The number of slaves varied from six to ten in a small establishment and from thirty to forty in a large establishment. They carried umbrellas and palanquins and did other menial work. They cost little to buy, fifteen to twenty Naples crowns, and scarcely anything to keep, only a dish of rice once a day. They were blacks brought by Portuguese, ships from Africa. Some were sold in war, some by their parents, and others, in despair, barbarously sold themselves. Churchill's Voyages, TV. 203.]

 Out-of-doors they rode in coaches drawn by oxen. The food was not good. The beef and pork were ill-tastad, they seldom killed sheep, and everybody could not go to the price of fowls. Their bread was excellent, and native fruits and many European herbs were plentiful. Under their coats the men wore an odd sort of breeches calledcandales, which when tied left something like the tops of boots on the leg. Others wore a short doublet, and under the doublet wide silk breeches, and some let their breeches hang to their ankles serving as hose.
Tarapur was well inhabited with monasteries of Dominicans and Recolets or Franciscans.

At Bassein the fortifications were not finished. The people of fashion wore silk and thin muslins with long breeches to the heels, without stockings, and with sandals instead of shoes. A bride was richly dressed in the French fashion. For fifteen miles between Bassein and Cassabo, that is Agashi, was nothing but delightful gardens planted with several sorts of country fruit-trees, as palms, figs, mangoes, and others with abundance of sugarcanes. The gardens were always green and fruitful, watered with engines. The gentry, tempted by the cool pleasant lanes, had all pleasure houses at Agashi, where they went in the hottest weather.

 About this time, besides the risk of slaughter by Pindhari free-booters and Maskat pirates, the people of Bassein were haunted by another form of sudden death. A plague, a pestilential disease called carazzo, exactly like a bubo, had for some years infested the north coast; cities were emptied in a few hours', Surat, Daman, Bassein, and Thana had all suffered.

 [This plague devastated Upper India from 1617 to 1625. Elliot and Dowson, VI. 407. It raged at Bijapur in 1689. Ditto, VII. 337. See Places of Interest, p. 33 and note 5.]
Salsette, the best part of which belonged to the Jesuits, was very rich yielding abundance of sugarcane, rice, and fruit. There were several villages of poor wretched Gentiles, Moors, and Christians living in wattle and daub houses covered with straw or palm-leaves. The peasants were worse than vassals to the lords of the villages. They were bound to till the land or to farm as much as might put them in a condition to pay the landlord. They fled like slaves from one village to another, and their landlords brought them back by force. Those who held from large proprietors paid their rent in grain, sometimes with the addition of personal service. Those who held direct from the state paid the Government factor or treasurer a monthly imposition according to what they were worth.

The chief places in the island were Bandra, Versova, and Thana. Thana stood in open country excellent good for India. It had three monasteries and a famous manufacture of calicoes. [Churchill, IV. 198.]
Careri makes no mention of the loss and havoc caused by recent raids and disturbances. But he tells of fierce fights at sea with the Maskat pirates;

 [There were still men of valour among the Portuguese. The admiral Antonio-Machado de Brito, who was killed in a brawl in Goa in 1694 (3rd of December), had freed the Portuguese territory from banditti and defeated fourteen Arab ships which had attacked three vessel's under his command. Churchill, IV. 199.] of the Malabars, pirates of several nations, Moors, Hindus, Jews, and Christians, who with a great number of boats full of men fell on all they met; and of Shivaji, the mortal enemy of the Portuguese, so strong that he could fight both the Moghals and the Portuguese. He brought into the field fifty thousand horse and as many or more foot, much better soldiers than the Moghals, for they lived a whole day on a piece of dry bread while the Moghals marched at their ease, carrying their women and abundance of provision and tents, so that they seemed a moving city. Shivaji's subjects were robbers by sea and by land. It was dangerous at any time to sail along their coast, and impossible without a large convoy. When a ship passed their forts, the Savajis ran out in small well-manned boats, and robbed friend and foe. This was the pay their king allowed them.
                                                      Trade, 1660-1710.
During the first fifty years of the British possession of Bombay the trade of the Thana coast shows a gradual falling off in all the ports except in Bombay.

 In Bombay between 1664 and 1684 'trade flourished and increased wonderfully.' [Hamilton's New Account, I. 186.] This was the turning point in the modern history of the trade of the Thana coast, whenas of old, it began to draw to itself the chief foreign commerce of Western India.

 Between 1684 and 1688 Bombay was the centre of English commerce with Western India. [Khafi Khan, who 'seems to have visited Bombay before Child's troubles began, was much struck by its strength and richness. Inside of the fortress from the gate, on each side of the road, was a line of English youths of twelve or fourteen years, shouldering excellent muskets. At every step were young Englishmen with sprouting beards, handsome and well-clothed with fine muskets in their hands. Further on were Englishmen with long beards alike in age, accoutrements, and dress. Further on were Englishmen with white beards, clothed in brocade, with muskets on their shoulders, drawn up in two ranks in perfect array. Next were some English children, handsome and wearing pearls on the borders of their hats. Altogether there must have been nearly seven thousand musketeers, dressed and armed as for a review. Elliot and Dowson, VII. 351-352.]

Then came the collapse and the years of deadly depression and of strife between the London and the English Companies, ending in 1702 in the formation of the New United Company.
In the beginning of the eighteenth century Hamilton [Hamilton's knowledge of this coast lasted over about forty years from about 1680 to 1720.] enters on his map of the Thana coast, Daman, Cape St. John, Tarapur, Bassein, Bombay, and Chaul. Besides these he mentions, between Daman and Bassein, Dahanu, Tarapur, Mahim-Kellem or Kelva-Mahim and the island of Vaccas or Agashi, and between Bassein and Bombay, Versova, Bandra, and Mahim.

 Of these ports Daman, in former times a place of good trade, was reduced to poverty; Dahanu, Tarapur, Kelva-Mahim and the island of Vaccas were ' of small account in the table of trade;' Bassein was a place of small trade, its riches dead and buried in the churches; Versova was a small town driving a small trade, in dry-fish; Bandra was most conspicuous, but it had no trade as the mouth of the river was pestered with rocks; Bombay, as noticed above, had fallen very low. Trade was so bad that, according to Hamilton,
 in 1696 the Governor Sir John Gayer preferred a prison in Surat where he could employ his money, to Government house in Bombay where there was no chance of trade. Thana, Kalyan, and Panvel are passed over in silence. Chaul, once a noted place of trade, was miserably poor. [Hamilton's New Account, I. 179, 243.]
No details have been traced of the trade of Bombay at this period. Apparently vessels from Bombay occasionally traded to England, and to almost all the known Asiatic and east African ports. The following summary serves to show the character of the trade in which, a few years before, Bombay had played a considerable part, and in which, after a few years of almost complete effacement, it again acquired a large and growing share.
Of Indian ports north of the Thana coast, there were in Sindh, Tatta with a very large and rich trade; Cutchnagar apparently Cutchigad six miles north of Dwarka; Mangrol, and Pormain with considerable traffic; Diu, one of the best cities in India, but three-fourths empty; Gogha, a pretty large town with some trade; Cambay, a large city, a place of good trade; Broach, famous for its fine cloth and for its cotton 'the best in the world'; Surat, a great city with a very considerable trade ' in spite of convulsions'; Navsari, with a good manufacture of coarse and fine cloth; and Gandevi, with excellent teak exported and used in building houses and ships.
South of Chaul to Goa the coast towns were small and poor, empty and tradeless, the coast harassed by pirates.[ Hamilton mentions Danda-Rajpuri or Janjira, Zeferdon or Shrivardhan in Janjira, Babhol, Rajapur, Gheria, Malvan, and Vengurla. New Account, I. 244-248.]

 Even Goa had little trade except in palm-juice arrack, which was bought yearly in great quantities by the English for punch.

 Between Goa and Cape Comorin, Karwar, Honavar, and Bhatkal had a good trade. Mangalor was the greatest mart in Kanara, and Kannanur, Kalikat, and Kochin weve all centres of considerable commerce.

 On the east coast Fort St. David was one of the most prosperous places; Madras was a well-peopled colony, and Masulipatam, Calcutta, and Hugli were great centres of trade.[Hamilton'3 New Account, II. 19.]
In the Persian Gulf, on the east coast, were Gombroon with English and Dutch factories and a good trade, Gong with a small trade, Bushire with a pretty good trade, and Bassora and Bagdad great cities much depressed by a pestilence and by the conquest of the Turks.

 On the west of the gulf, Maskat was strongly fortified and well supplied with merchandise. On the east coast of Arabia were Kuria-Muria, Doffar, and Kassin, inhospitable ports with a dislike of strangers and only a small trade. Aden was a place of little commerce. Its trade had passed to Mocha, the port of the great inland city of Sunan, with English and Dutch factories.

 Of the Red Sea marts, Jidda on the east coast and Massua on the west coast were the most important. [These were, travelling west from Mokha, Mohai, Zibet, Jidda, with a great trade from the concourse of pilgrims to Mecca, Suez where trade was impossible from the intolerable avarice of the Turks, Zuakin, Massua, and Zcyla.]

 On the east coast of Africa, Magadoxo, Patta, Mombas, and Mozambique had little trade with India, partly because of the English pirates of Mozambique and partly because the coast as far south as Mombassa had lately (1692 -1698) passed from the Portuguese to the Imam of Maskat.

South of Mombassa there was little trade except some Portuguese traffic with Sena and some British dealing with Natal, Passing east, by the south of India, the rich trade of

Ceylon was almost entirely in the hands of the Dutch and the English. 

On the east coast of the Bay of Bengal the chief places of trade were Chittagong, Arrakan, Syrian the only open port in Pegu, whose glory was laid in the dust by late wars with Siam and by its conquest by Burmah.

Further east were Merji and Tenasserim, Malacca under the Dutch apparently with much lessened trade, Achin in Sumatra a rich and important mart for Indian goods, and Bencolin also in Sumatra with an English colony. The rich spice trade of Java and Borneo was in the hands of the Dutch.
 Siam and Cambodia were rich and were anxious to trade with the English.

 Cochin-China had little trade, but Tonquin was powerful and commercial. In China, ' the richest and best governed empire in the world; the chief places where the English traded were Canton, Amoy, and Souchou. Amoy at the beginning of the eighteenth century was a great centre of English trade, but it was closed some years later by order of the Emperor. Japan in 1655 had risen on the Portuguese and killed the Christians, and the Dutch had taken advantage of Charles II.'s marriage with the Infanta of Portugal to persuade the Japanese to forbid the English to trade.
The trade between Bombay and other Thana ports was chiefly in grain, vegetables, fruit, fowls, and mutton for the Bombay market, and in teak from Bassein for house and ship building. This local trade was much hampered by the demands of the Portuguese and by taxes in Bombay. [The Portuguese levied a duty of 33 per cent and a transit fee of 20 per cent on timber passing Bassein. Anderson's Western India, 86. In Bombay Hamilton (New Account, I. 240) writes, ' I have seen Portuguese subjects bring twenty or thirty poultry to the market, and have five of the best taken for the custom of the rest.'] The barrier of customs-houses, English Portuguese and Marathi, and the disturbed state of the Deccan prevented any considerable inland trade. [There was live per cent to pay in Bombay, eight per cent in Thana, and arbitrary exactions in Kaiyan. Bruee's Annals, III, 230.]

Gujarat chiefly exported corn, cloth, and cotton, and the Kathiawar ports yielded cotton, corn, cloth, pulse, and butter, and took pepper, sugar, and betelnut. From the South Konkan ports almost the only exports were cattle from Janjira and arrack from Goa. The Kanara ports yielded teak and poon timber, and
the Malabar coast rice, sandalwood, pepper, betelnuts, and plenty of iron and steel. The east
Madras ports yielded diamonds, the best tobacco in India, and beautiful chintz, and
Calcutta and Hugli yielded saltpetre, piecegoods, silk, and opium.
Outside of India the ports in the Persian Gulf took Indian cloth and timber, and European broadcloth and hardware; they exported dates, rose-water, horses, and dry-fish.
 The east Arab ports took coarse calicoes, and exported myrrh, olibanum, frankincense, pearls, horses, and a red resin.
Aden exported horses, finely shaped and mettlesome but very dear £50 or £60 being thought a small price for one.
Mokha exported coffee, myrrh, and frankincense;
Socotra exported aloes, and the
Abyssinian ports low-gold, ivory, slaves, coffee, and ostrich feathers. The only dealings with the East African ports was a little Portuguese traffic in gold with Sena, and a British traffic in ivory with Natal.
Ceylon was famous for its cinnamon, emeralds, sapphires, and cats-eyes. Syrian in
 Pegu imported Indian goods, European hats, and silver and lead which passed for money; it exported timber, ivory, lac, iron, tin, earth-oil, rubies, and diamonds.
 Achin and Bencolin in Sumatra took large quantities of Indian goods, and exported fine gold-dust and ivory.
Siam had timber and agala wood.
Cambodia had ivory, stick-lac, gum, and raw silk. Tonquin was rich in gold and copper, abundance of raw silk, lacquered ware, and coarse porcelain; the
Chinese ports took putchoc from Cutch as incense, and exported gold, copper, raw and wrought silks, lacquered ware, porcelain, tea, and rhubarb. Gold was plentiful in Japan, and its earthenware, lacquered work, and silks were in 'many respects better than the corresponding manufactures of China.
From England came lead in pigs, barrels of tar, sword blades and penknives, spectacles, looking-glasses, swinging glasses, hubble-bubbles, rosewater bottles, guns, and flowered cloth green scarlet and white. [Surat Diaries for 1700.] The exports were indigo, pepper, coffee, drugs, cotton wool, cloth, cotton, myrrh, aloes, saltpetre, book-muslins, and dorias [Brace's Annals, III. 513, 521, 533, and 534.]
Among the Bombay merchants, the number of English, both in the Company's service and as private traders, had increased.
 The other merchants were chiefly Armenians, Hindus, and Musalmans. As in former times, Hindu traders were settled at great distances from India. In 1669, among the schemes for increasing the population of Bombay was one for tempting Persian Banians to settle in the Island. [Brace's Annals, II. 267. The context shows that this means Hindus from the gulf, not Parsis.] About 1700, at Bandar Abas the Banians were strong enough and rich enough to prevent the slaughter of cattle by paying a fine. [Hamilton's New Account I. 97.] Banians were also settled at Cong and Bassora, [Hamilton's New Account, I. 84, 93.] and at Mokha.[Hamilton's New Account, I. 42.]
Some of the ships used by the English were of great size. Hamilton was at one time in command of a vessel that drew twenty-one feet. The native merchants had also large fleets of fine vessels. One Muhammadan merchant of Surat had a fleet of twenty sail varying from 200 to 800 tons. [Hamilton's New Account, I. 149.] English captains were in much request with the Moghals of India, who gave them handsome salaries and other indulgences. [Hamilton's New Account, I. 237. The captain had from £10 to £15 a month,[100 to 150 rupees] mates from £5 to £9, and gunners and boatswains good salaries. They were also allowed to do some private trade.]
                                                      Pirates, 1700.
The sea seems to have been specially troubled with pirates. The most dangerous were the Europeans, of whom Captains Every, Kidd, and Green were the most notorious.

Hamilton notices two nests of European pirates, near Madagascar and on the east coast of the Bay of Bengal. [Hamilton's New Account, I.19, 43, 320; II 67. Accounts are also given in Low's Indian Navy, I. 78.]

Next to the European pirates the most formidable were the Maskat Arabs, who sometimes with fleets of as many as 1500 men scoured the west coast of India. [Low's Indian Navy, I. 311, 312, 321. Hamilton's New Account, I.139.. 

Hamilton, perhaps on the ground of their common hate of-the Portuguese, was well treated by the Maskat Arabs. Ditto, I. 71, 76.] Along the west coast of India were many nests of pirates, of which the chief were the Sanganiaus on the north coast of Kathiawar, the Warels of Chhani on the south coast, the Sidis, Marathas, Angrias and Savants in the Konkan, and the pirates of Porka on the Malabar coast. [Hamilton's New Account, I. 134, 141247; Low's Indian Navy, I. 97.]
                                                    Bombay, 1710-1720.
After, the union of the London and the English Companies in 1708, Bombay began to recover from its deep depression.

 By 1716, the population had increased to 16,000, provisions were abundant, and thanks to the building of a strong dyke at the Great Breach, much of the salt swamps had dried, and the climate was pleasant and with care as healthy as England.

The Town Wall was finished in 1716, and the Cathedral was begun in November 1715 and finished in 1718. [Bom. Quar. Rev. 33-38; Hamilton's New Account, I. 188. Hamilton (New Account, I. 21) describes Mr. Boone, under whom these improvements were made, as a gentleman of as much honour and good sense as ever sat in the Governor's chair.']

In all other parts of Thana, the death of Aurangzeb was the beginning of fresh struggles and loss. The release of Shahu, which happened soon after Aurangzeb's death, caused a division among the Marathas, and,

 in the struggles between the heads of the state, Angria made himself nearly independent, and spread his power over the south of Thana as far east as the Rajmachi fort near the Bor pass and as far north as Bhiwndi

[Angria seems to have made grants ten miles north of Bhiwndi. Mr. Sinclair in Ind. Ant. IV. 65.]

The coast districts suffered more than ever from the raids of Arab pirates.

Four times between 1712 and 1720 they fought the Portuguese fleet which they formerly used carefully to avoid. [Kloguen in Nairne's Konkan, 79.

 According to Hamilton (New Account, I. 76) the Arabs of Maskat were by no means savage pirates. They spared churches, killed no one in cold blood, and treated their captives courteously.]

About this time (1713) Balaji Vishvanath, a Chitpavan Brahman of Shrivardhan near Bankot, rose to be the leading adviser of the Satara branch of the Maratha state. His power was increased by the formal 
withdrawal of the Moghals from the Konkan in 1720, and by the settlement of the dispute between the Satara and the Kolhapur branches of the house of Shivaji in 1730. [Grant Duff, 209, 203 and 223.]

 Between 1713 and 1727 Angria's power was at its highest.

On several occasions, in 1717, 1719, 1720, and 1722, the English from Bombay, sometimes alone sometimes with the Portuguese, attacked Vijaydurg, Khanderi, and Kolaba, but never with success. [Nairne's Konkan, 80.]
                                              The Portuguese, 1727.
About 1720 the relations between the Portuguese and the English were more than usually strained. The Bombay Government found that the Portuguese priests were stirring up their people, who numbered about 5000 or one-third of the population of the island, against the English.

They accordingly resolved, that instead of the Viceroy of Goa appointing the priests, the congregations should choose their priests, and that the priest chosen by the people should be nominated by the Bombay Government.

 Enraged at this change the Portuguese General of the North forbade the transport of provisions to Bombay, and seized English craft in the Mahim river.

Governor Boone retaliated (5th July 1720) by proclaiming the lands of all absentee Portuguese confiscated to Government, and among other properties Parel was taken from the Jesuits and made a Government House.
The British messengers who were sent to Bandra to make the proclamation were seized, carried to Thana in irons, and there hoisted on a gibbet. On their return, sound in limb 'but very sore and mighty terrified,'
 a small body of British troops was sent to Mahim. A well-aimed shell, lighting on the roof of the Jesuit Church at Bandra, killed several of the priests and brought the rest to terms.

Two years later some Portuguese, found contrary to agreement repairing a fort apparently at Kurla, were attacked and driven off with the loss of twenty or thirty lives. [Hamilton's New Account, I. 182; Grose's Voyage, I. 46; Bom. Quar. Rev. III. 60-63. In 1722 there was also a customs dispute which led to blows. O Chron. de Tis. II. 34.]
In 1727 the Portuguese made some efforts to check the decay of their power. An officer was sent to examine the defences of their Thana possessions and Buggest reforms, and a scheme was started for laying back the island of Bombay. The officer sent to examine the defences found the management most loose and corrupt. [The report is given in 0. Chron. de Tis. I. 30-34, 50-53.] There was no systematic defence. The militia was in confusion. There was no discipline: some were called captains and some corporals, but all were heads. Of the troops of horse, the Daman troop was never more than forty strong, and the Bassein troop never more than eight. So weak were they that the infantry had to go into the field while the horse stayed in the fort, the troopers being filled with vices and the horses full of disease from want of exercise. [0. Chron, de Tis, I. 29-35.]
Bassein had ninety pieces of artillery from three to twenty-four pounders. The garrison was eighty men, almost all natives, many of them sick or past work. Of twelve artillerymen five were useless. There was no discipline.. If it was hot or if it was wet, the men on guard left their posts and took shelter in some neighbouring house. The walls were ruined in many places, and, towards the sea side, a sand-hill rose as high as the curtain of the wall. Some rice dams had turned the force of the tide on to the north wall and endangered it.

 The country between Bassein and Agashi was green, fertile, and well-wooded, the gem of the province. But the creek which used to guard it on the land side had been allowed to silt, and in places might be crossed dry-shod. The hill of Nilla, Nil Dungri about two miles east of Sopara, had been fortified without the help of an engineer. The bastions were so small that there was no room to work a four-pounder gun.
 At Sopara, the great gap near Bolinj had been strengthened by a stockade, but the pillars were rotting and were hardly able to hold two cannon. The palm stockade at Saivan was so decayed that a few shots would bring it to the ground. Five companies of a nominal strength of 250 men guarded the Saivan villages. In the decay of honour the actual strength of each company was not more than ten or twelve men, and they were little better than thieves, fleecing their friends but never facing the foe. So thoroughly had they forgotten their drill that they could not even talk of it. Through Kaman there was an easy entrance to Salsette. It was deplorable to see so rich an island, with its seventy-one villages, supporting Bassein and great part of Goa, so utterly unguarded. It was open to attack from the Sidi, the English, or the Marathas. 
At Thana, to guard the dry ford across the creek, there were to the south the towers of Sam Pedro and Sam Jeronimo, one with four soldiers and four guns, the other with two soldiers and two guns, and to the north was the Deis Magos with four soldiers and four pieces of artillery. These towers were of no use. They stopped the shipping, but could never stop an enemy. A royal fort should be built and the creek guarded.
The Versova fort was small, ugly, old, and ruined. It had a garrison of fifty men and ten pieces of artillery, but only two of the pieces were serviceable.
The fort at Shabaz, or Belapur, had four companies of 180 men, with fourteen guns from four to twelve pounders.
 On the Karanja island were 400 men able to carry arms. The fort on the plain had a garrison of fifty men, one artilleryman, and six one to six-pounder guns.
In the north, Manor was not worthy of the name of a fort, the wall in places being not more than six feet high. There was a garrison of 104 men, and eight guns of which five were useless. The magazine was bad and the bastions ruined. The captain took contracts for timber, and, neglecting his duty, employed his men in the menial work of hawling logs. There were 150 men on Asheri, but, as at Manor, they were timber-draggers rather than soldiers. All showed neglect and waste, many of the men being old and useless.
The Kelva-Mahim fort was irregular and feeble. There was a garrison of sixty men, of whom seven were white; there were fifteen two to ten-pounder guns but no artillerymen. Many of the arms were unserviceable. There was also a stockade with a captain and thirty men, fourteen of whom had been sent to Santa Cruz opposite Kalyan.
At Tarapur were sixty men and twenty three to twelve-pounder guns. There were no artillerymen. Of the sixty men thirty were at Santa Cruz. Things seemed beyond cure. The abuses were so ingrained that they seemed natural. Besides there was no money and even were money spent and things put straight, unless there were more Europeans all would again go wrong. In the last twenty years decay had been most rapid.
The troops consisted of several small detachments, each on a different footing from the other. Three companies belonged to the army of Goa, six were flying companies, two belonged to the administration, and seven were of sepoys. Besides these, nine companies had lately been raised, but they had no pay and were fed by their captains. There ought to be a force of twenty companies, regular muster rolls, and pay certificates and better pay. Half the men should be white.
 The only power that was to be dreaded was the Maratha court. Friendly relations should be established with the Marathas. Yearly presents would save many of the raids, which during the last thirteen years had ruined the miserable lands of Daman. The Portuguese nobles, as was originally the case, should be forced to build a moated fort or tower in each village and keep a body of twenty men able to carry arms.
This exposure was not in vain.
A beautiful fort was begun at Thana, and judging by the result a few years later, other leading fortifications were repaired and the garrisons strengthened and made more serviceable.

As regards the scheme of buying back Bombay the Viceroy Joao de Saldanha da Gama, on the 18th of January 1727, sent the King along report estimating what the purchase would cost and how the funds could be raised. The negotiations, or at least inquiries and calculations for the English do not seem to have been consulted, went on till the overthrow of the Portuguese in 1739.
[ Archivo Portuguez Oriental Fas. 6. Supplement New Goa, 1876, 287-292. The following are the chief details of the result of this inquiry: '

 Bombay had two towns or kasbas,Bombay and Mahim; it had eight villages, Mazgaon, Varli, Parel, Vadala (between Parel and Matunga), Naigaon (south of Vadala and north of Parel), Matunga, Dharavi, and the island of Kolis or Kolaba; it had seven hamlets, two, Aivaris and Gauvari under Vadala; two, Bamanvali and Coltem? under Dharavi, and three, Bhoivada, Pomala, and Salgado under Parel; and it had five Koli quarters under Bombay, Mazgaon, Varli, Parel, and Sion. There were three saltpans, at Kasli north of Matunga, Siwri, and Vadali. The estimated produce and revenue of the different parts of the island were, of the towns, Bombay 40,000 cocoa-palms, some rice lands, and old rice-lands now built on, and Mahim 70,000 coooa-palms and 592 mudds of rice. Of the eight villages, Mazgaon yielded 184 mudas of rice and bad 250 brab-palms, with a yearly revenue of about Xms. 4000; Varli 34 mudas worth about Xms. 7000; Parel, including its three hamlets, 154 mudas and some brab-palms yielding about Xms. 4000; Vadala, with its two hamlets, 75 mudas and some brab-palms Xms. 1900; Naigaon, 42 mudas and some brab-palms Xms. 1000; Matunga 65 mudas and 100 brab-palms Xms. 1700; Sion, 54mudas and a few palms Xms. 1400 ; Dhravi, with two hamlets, 23 mudas and a few brab-palms Xms. 625. Kolaba worth Xms. 400C to Xms. 5000. The salt-pans yielded Xms. 2300 and the Koli suburbs about Xms. 7000. There were two distilleries,bandharastis (?), at Bombay and at Mahim. Of other sources of revenue the Bombay and Mahim customs-houses yielded about Xms. 52,000, a tobacco tax Xms. 19,000, an excise Xms. 12,000, quit-rents Xms. 3000, and the Mahim ferry Xms. 1200. The total was roughly estimated at Xms. 160,000. The fortifications of the island were, the castle with six bastions begun in 1716, well armed; a small fort on Dongri; a small bastion at Mazgaon, wife a sergeant and 24 men and 3 guns; Siwri fort on the shore, with asubhedar and 50 sepoys and from 8 to 10 guns; the small tower and breastwork of Sion, with a captain and 62 men and nine or ten guns; three bastions at Mahim, with 100 men and 30 guns; a fort on Varli hill, with an ensign and 25 men and seven or eight guns; the island of Patecas (Butcher's" Island) belonging to Mazgaon, with a fort, begun by General Boone in 1722, and about seventy seamen and six or seven guns.]
Kanhoji's death in 1731 and the struggles that followed among his sons lessened the power of the Angrias.
A few years later (1734),
the death of Yakub Khan and a disputed succession lowered the power of the Sidis,
and in 1735 the Peshwa took many of his forts. [Grant Duff, 231-232.] The Konkanasth Brahmans, now the first power in the Konkan, were able to turn their whole strength against the Portuguese, whom they hated as Christians and as strangers, and for whose ports and rich coast-lands they had long hungered.
 The Marathas began to press the Portuguese. Year after year news reached Bombay that the Marathas had seized a fresh Portuguese fort, or appropriated the revenues of one more Portuguese district. In 1731 Thana was threatened, and the Government of Bombay, who felt that the success of the Marathas endangered their island, sent three hundred men to garrison Thana, but soon after withdrew the aid.[Bom. Quar. Rev, IV. 78.]
                                 Attack the Portuguese,1739.
In 1737, by siding with Sambhaji Angria against the Peshwa's friend Manaji Angria, the Portuguese gave the Marathas a pretext for attacking them. The time favoured the Marathas. Goa was harassed by the Bhonsles, and Angria's fleet was at the Peshwa's service. The first step taken by the Marathas was to attack the island fort of Arnala, off the mouth of the Vaitarna. The fort was taken and the commandant and the garrison put to the sword.
  The Marathas next (April 1737) attacked Salsette, took Ghod-bandar and put the garrison to the sword, and, gaining command the river, prevented help being sent from Bassein to Thana.
At Thana, though the fort was well advanced, the defences were unfinished. The captain fled to Karanja, and though the garrison made a gallant defence, successfully driving back two assaults, in the end they were forced to capitulate. [Bom. Quar. Rev. III. 273. Grose (1750) Bays (Voyage, I. 68): ' 

The Marathas stepped in when the fort was almost finished. They found the guns not mounted 'and openings still in the walls.']
The English sent men and ammunition to Bandra, but the defences were useless and the place was abandoned, and fell to the Marathas without a struggle.
 In 1738 the Portuguese made strenuous efforts to regain what they had lost. They defeated the Marathas at Asheri, and a gallant attack on Thana might have succeeded, had not the English warned the Marathas of the Portuguese preparations and supplied the garrison with powder and shot. [ Bom. Quar. Rev. IV. 79. 
This caused the bitterest ill-feeling between the English and the Portuguese; the Portuguese general in his letters, laying aside the usual formal courtesies.]
 In January 1739 Chimnaji Appa, the Peshwa's brother, took command of the Maratha troops, and, in spite of obstinate resistance, captured most of the northern forts, Katalvada, Dahanu, Kelve, Shrigaon, and Tarapur, whose walls were scaled by the Marathas, the Portuguese 'fighting with the bravery of Europeans,' till they were overwhelmed by numbers.
 Versova and Dharavi in Salsette, which still held out for the Portuguese, next surrendered, and the siege of Bassein was begun.
                                                   Fall of Bassein, 1739.
The commandant of Bassein offered to pay tribute, but the offer was refused; he appealed to the English at first in vain, but he afterwards received from them a loan of £1500 (Rs. 15,000). [Bom. Quar. Rev. IV. 82-83.] The siege was pressed with the greatest skill and perseverance, and Angria's fleet blocked all hope of succour. Still, with the help of some Portuguese lately come from Europe, so gallant was the resistance, little less brilliant than the heroic defences of Diu and Chaul, that before Bassein was taken three months (17th February-16th May) had passed and 5000 Marathas were slain. [Nairne's Konkan, 83. The Portuguese loss was returned at 800 men. Ditto. Details of the siege are given under Bassein, Places of Interest.
 The Maratha management of the siege greatly impressed the English. Grose (1750) wrote, ' The Marathas, taught by European deserters, raised regular batteries, threw in bombshells, and proceeded by sap and mine.' (Voyage, I. 80). They paid the European gunners well, he says in another passage (79), but never let them leave, and in old age suffered them to linger in misery and poverty,] The terms were honourable both to the Marathas and to the Portuguese. The garrison was allowed to march out with the honours of war, and those who wished to leave the country were granted eight days in which to collect their property. [Da Cunha's Chaul and Bassein, 149.] Most of the large landholders gave up their estates and sailed for Goa. Except five churches, four in Bassein and one in Salsette, which the Maratha general agreed to spare, every trace of Portuguese rule seemed fated to pass away. [Nairne's Konkan, 84.] A high authority, Governor Duncan, in Regulation I. of 1808, traces the fall of the Portuguese to the unwise zeal of their priests and to their harsh treatment of their Hindu and Musalman subjects: [So also according to Grose [Voyage, I. 167 (1750)] the Portuguese cruelty had not a little share in determining the Marathas to invade them.] Khafi Khan's statements, [Elliot and Dowson, VII. 211-212, 845-340.] that the Portuguese treated their people kindly, and that, till the close of the seventeenth century, Hindus and Musalmans continued to settle in Portuguese territory, prove that harshness and bigotry were not the causes of the fall of the Portuguese

 The causes of their fall were that the Portuguese in Europe, careless of their Indian possessions, failed to keep the European garrison at its proper strength; that the officials in India, keen only to make money, let then defences fall to ruin; and that the hardy vigour of both gentry and priests had turned to softness and sloth. All rested in an empty trust in the name which their forefathers had left, wilfully blind to the law that to be rich and weak is to court attack and ruin[The conduct of the British in refusing to help the Portugese has been severely blamed (Nairne's Konkan, 83; Bom. Quar. Rev. IV. 82). Portuguese writers go so far as to state that the English supplied the Marathas with engineers and with bombs (Joze de Noronha, 1772, in O. Chron. de Tis. II. 16). According to Grose, who wrote in 1750, the reasons why the English did not help the Portuguese were, ' the foul practices' of the Kandra Jesuits against the English interest in 1720, their remissness in failing to finish the Thana fort, and the danger of enraging the Marathas, whose conduct of the war against the Portuguese deeply impressed the English. Voyage, I. 48-51.]
                            Fate of the Portuguese, 1740.
On the fall of Bassein, the Government of Bombay sent boats to bring away the garrison. To the commandant the Bombay Government paid the attention which his courage and misfortunes deserved. They allowed his officers and about eight hundred of his men to remain on the island during the monsoon, and advanced a monthly allowance of four thousand rupees for their maintenance. [Bom. Quar. Rev. IV. 86-87.] Though most of the Salsette gentry retired to Goa, many families took refuge in Bombay. It was melancholy, says Grose (1750), to see the Portuguese nobles reduced on a sudden from riches to beggary. Besides what they did publicly to help the Portuguese, the English showed much private generosity. One gentleman, John de Souza Ferras, was extremely pitied by the English. He had owned a considerable estate in Salsette, and had endeared himself to the English by his kindness and hospitality. He continued many years in Bombay caressed and esteemed. [Grose's Voyage, I. 73.] At the close of the rains the Portuguese troops refused to leave Bombay, till their arrears were paid. This demand was met by the Bombay Government, who advanced a sum of £5300 (Rs. 53,000). On the 29th of September the Portuguese were taken to Chaul in native vessels, under a Government convoy. The commandant and, the Vceroy of Goa united in sending the Governor of Bombay the warmest acknowledgments of his kindness. But the sufferings of the Portuguese troops were not over. From Chaul they marched by land, and, on the 15th of November, when within two hours march of shelter in Goa, they were attacked and routed by Khem Savant with the loss of two hundred of their best men. The English Commodore saw the miserable remnant arrive in Goa with ' care and grief in every face.' [Bom. Quar. Rev. IV. 88.]

 As they were no longer able to hold them, the Portuguese offered the English Chaul and Korlai fort on the south bank of the Chaul river. The English could not spare the men to garrison these places, but trusted that by ceding them to the Marathas they would gain their regard, and might be able to arrange terms between the Portuguese and the Marathas. The Portuguese placed their interests in the hands of the English. The negotiation was entrusted to Captain Inchbird, and though the Marathas at first demanded Daman and a share in the Goa customs, as well as Chaul, Inchbird succeeded in satisfying them with Chaul alone. Articles of peace were signed on the 14th of October 1740. [Bom, Quar. Rev. IV. 87-89.]
                             Bombay, 1740.
Except the island of Bombay, the wild north-east, and some groups of Angria's villages in the south-east corner, of which, at his leisure he could take what parts were worth taking, the Peshwa was now ruler of the whole of Thana. The change caused great uneasiness in Bombay. Soon after the fall of Bassein two envoys were sent to the Marathas, Captain Inchbird to treat with Chimnaji Appa at Bassein, and Captain Gordon to conciliate the Raja of Satara in the Deccan. Bombay was little prepared to stand such an attack as had been made on Bassein. The town wall was only eleven feet high and could be easily breached by heavy ordnance; there was no ditch, and the trees and houses in front of the wall offered shelter to an attacking force. [Bom. Quar. Rev. IV. 91.] A ditch was promptly begun, the merchants opening their treasure and subscribing £3000 (Rs. 30,000) ' as much as could be expected in the low state of trade'; all Native troops were forced to take their turn at the work; gentlemen and civilians were provided with arms and encouraged to learn their use; half-castes or topazes were enlisted and their pay was raised; the embodying of a battalion of sepoys was discussed; and the costly and long-delayed work of clearing of its houses and trees a broad space round the town walls was begun. Though the Marathas scoffed at it, threatening to fill it with their slippers, it was the ditch that saved Bombay from attack.
The embassies were skilfully conducted and were successful. Captain Inchbird concluded a favourable treaty with Chimnaji Appa, [Free trade subject to customs duties between the English and the Marathas: the English to have dominion over the Mahim creek. Aitchison's Treaties, V. 14.] and Captain Gordon returned from the Deccan with the assurance that the leading Maratha chiefs admitted the value of English trade and would not molest Bombay. [Aitcgison's Treaties V. 11-15; Low Indian Navy, I, 113; Bom. Quar. Rev. III. 333-336.]
 The feeling of security brought by these successful embassies soon passed away.
When their fleet left, convoying some merchantmen, Angria became insolent, and news came of the gathering of a great Maratha force at Thana. Alaran turned to panic. Numbers fled burying or carrying away their valuables. Should the fleet be sent to convoy merchantmen, or should trade be sacrificed and the fleet kept to guard the harbour? This dilemma was solved in a disastrous way for Bombay. On the 9th of November a frightful storm destroyed their three finest grabs, completely armed and equipped and commanded by three experienced captains. Instantly Sambhaji Angria appeared in the harbour, and carried away fourteen fishing boats and eighty-four of their crews. Remonstrance was vain, retaliation impossible.[Bom. Quar. Rev. IV. 96-97. ]
The immediate danger passed over, but for nearly twenty years Bombay lived in fear and trembling.

In 1750, Grose laments that the friendly, or, at worst, harmless belt of Portuguese territory that used to guard them from the Marathas was gone. They were face to face with a power, unfriendly at heart, whose officers were always pressing the government to lead them to Bombay, and let them raze its wretched fort and pillage its markets. The Marathas were proverbially treacherous and unbindable by treaties, and since European deserters had taught them how to carry on sieges, they were very formidable enemies. It was Governor Bourchier's (1750-1760) chief claim to praise that he succeeded in keeping the Marathas in good humour. The Marathas knew that they gained much by European trade. But there was no trusting to their keeping this in mind. A change of ministers, a clamour for the sack of Bombay, a scheme to humour the troops, was enough to make them break their pledges of friendship even though they knew that the breach was against their interests. [Grose's Voyage, I. 44.] To all human appearance, Bombay ceased to be tolerable the instant the Marathas resolved on its conquest. Even could the fort hold out, it could be blockaded, and supplies cut off.[Grose'a Voyage, I.96.]
                                 The Marathas,1750.
Grose gives interesting particulars of these terrible Marathas, who had taken Thana and Bassein, and who held Bombay in the hollow of their hands. Most of them were land-tillers called Kurumbis, of all shades from deep black to light brown, the hill-men fairer than the coast-men. They were clean-limbed and straight, some of them muscular and large bodied, but from their vegetable diet, light, easily overborne in battle both by Moors and by Europeans. Their features were regular, even delicate. They shaved the head except the top-knot and two side curls, which, showing from the helmet, gave them an unmanly look. The rest of their dress was mean, a roll of coarse muslin round the head, a bit of cloth round the middle, and a loose mantle on the shoulders also used as bedding. The officers did not much out figure the men. To look at, no troops were so despicable. The men lived on rice and water carried in a leather bottle; the officers fared little better. Their pay was small, generally in rice, tobacco, salt, or clothes. The horses were small but hardy, clever in rough roads, and needing little fodder. The men were armed with indifferent muskets mostly matchlocks. These they used in bush firing, retreating in haste to the main body when they had let them off. Their chief trust was in their swords and targets. Their swords were of admirable temper, and they were trained swordsmen. European broadswords they held in contempt. Their targets were light and round, swelling to a point and covered with a lacquer, so smooth and hard that it would turn aside a pistol shot, even a musket shot at a little distance. They were amazingly rapid and cunning. The English would have no chance with them. They might pillage Bombay any day[Grose's Voyage, I. 83. In spite of this Maratha thunder cloud, Bombay was advancing rapidly to wealth and importance.

 In 1753 (1st December) the Government wrote to the Court; ' The number of inhabitants has so greatly increased that the crowded people are murmuring to have the town enlarged. Some very considerable bankers from Aurangabad and Poona have opened shops to the great advantage of trade.' (Warden's Landed Tenures, 77). This increase in prosperity was partly due to very liberal instructions about attracting strangers to Bombay in a letter from the Court dated 15th March 1748. (See Bom. Quar. Rev. V. 164). Bombay was no longer the Britons' burying-ground. The climate was better or was better understood, and much greater pains were taken to keep the town clean (Bom. Quar. Rev. V. 168). The strong dyke at the Great Breach, which was greatly damaged by a storm in 1728 (Bom. Quar. Rev. III. 331), had been repaired and the sea kept out of a large tract in the centre of the island. Mild management and religious indifference, allowing Hindus, Musalmans, Parsis, even Catholic 'Christians the free practice of their forms of worship, had tempted so many settlers that every inch of the island was tilled, and, in proportion to its size, yielded much more than Salsette. 
Among the Marathas, Bombay had a perilously great name for wealth. Its noble harbour was the centre of trade between Western and Upper India and the Malabar coast, the Persian Gulf, and the Bed Sea.
 Its well-built though badly placed castle and its costly moat made it one of the strongest of the Company s Indian possessions. The military force was of three branches, Europeans, Natives, and a local militia. The Europeans were either sent from England or were Dutch French and Portuguese deserters, or they were topazes that is half-Portuguese. The sepoys had English officers, wore the Indian dress, and carried muskets, swords, and targets. They were faithful and with European help they were staunch. The local militia of land-tillers and palm-tappers would prove useful against an invader. Next to Angria, perhaps equal to Angria, the English were the first naval power on the west coast. They had succeeded to the old Portuguese position of granting passes to native craft. [PASSES were granted by Child at least as early as 1687. Hamilton's New Account, I. 202, 216. The toon of pass used in 1734 is printed in Bom. Quar. Rev, IV. 188.] Were it not for the English navy, the seas would swarm with pirates and no unarmed vessel could escape. The English navy consisted partly of beautifully modelled English-built galleys carrying eighteen to twenty guns, provided- with oars, and specially useful in a calm. They had also a few grabs, modelled after Angria's grabs, with prows best suited for carrying chase guns, and a competent number of galivats or row-boats. Large European ships were also occasionally stationed at Bombay. The marine was chiefly manned by English or European deserters and drafts from the land forces, Grose's Voyage, I. 40, 43, 48,50.]
                                    Fall of Angria, 1757.
Fortunately for Bombay the Marathas remained friendly until two events, the destruction of Angria's power in 1757 and the crushing defeat of the Marathas at Panipat in 1761, raised the English to a position of comparative independence.

In 1755 the Marathas and English made a joint expedition against Angria. The Marathas proved feeble and lukewarm allies, but the English fleet under Commodore James took the important coast forts of Suvarndurg and Bankot in the north of Ratnagiri.
In 1757, strengthened by the presence of Admiral Watson and of Colonel Clive, the English attacked and took the great coast fort of Vijaydurg in Ratnagiri, burnt Angria's fleet, and utterly destroyed his power. [Details are given in Orme's History, I. 408, 417, and in Grose's Voyage, II. 214-227. See Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. X. 196, 381.]
They were still so afraid of the Marathas that the empty threat of an invasion of Bombay made the English break off a favourable agreement with Faris Khan at Surat. [Grant Duff, 303; Bombay Gazetteer, II. 125.]
 In the next year they gained command of Surat castle and became Admirals of the Moghal fleet. So encouraged were they with this success that, in 1760, they were bold enough to side with the Sidi against the Marathas and to hoist the English flag at Janjira[Grant Duff, 324.]

 The defeat of Panipat in 1761, the death of the Peshwa Balaji Bajirav, and the succession of a minor, freed the British from present fear of the Marathas.
[On the 7th January on the field of Panipat, fifty-three miles north of Delhi, the Marathas under Sadashivrao Bhau were defeated by the Afghans, and the Peshwa's brother and cousin, chiefs of distinction, and about 200,000 Marathas slain. Balaji Bajirav the Peshwa died heartbroken in he following June. Grant Duffs Marathas, 316, 317.]
Before the year was over they were in treaty with the Marathas for the cession of Salsette and Bassein, Raghunathrav the regent for Madhavrav refused to cede Salsette, but granted another important concession, the independence of the Sidi[Nairne's Konkan, 96. How greatly Maratha power was feared is shown by Niebuhr's remark when in 1774 he headed that the English had taken Salsette: ' I do not know whether they will be able to hold it against the great land forces of the Marathas.' Voyage en Arabie, French Ed. II. 2.] In 1766 Madhavrav had so far retrieved Maratha affairs, that he refused to listen to any proposal for the cession of Salsette and the harbour islands. [Nairne's Konkan, 96.]
On the conquest of Bassein in 1739 the Marathas introduced a regular and efficient government. Under the name of Bajipur or Bajirav's city, Bassein was made the head-quarters of the governor or sarsubhedar of the Konkan. Under the sarsubhedar were district officers, styled mamlatdars, whose charges generally yielded about £50,000 (Rs. 5,00,000) a year; and who, besides managing the revenue, administered civil and criminal justice and police. Under the mamlatdars were village headmen, or patils. In Salsette the Marathas raised the land assessment and levied many fresh cesses. In spite of these extra levies the island was fairly prosperous, till, in 1761, on the death of Bajirav, the system of farming the revenue was introduced. In Bassein grants were given to high-caste Hindus to tempt them to settle. The Native Christians were taxed and the proceeds spent in feeding Brahmans to purify them and make them Hindus. [Da Cunha's Chaul and Bassein, 149]
 In 1768 the district of Kalyan, stretching from the Pen river to the Vaitarna, had 742 villages yielding a land revenue of £45.000 (Rs. 4,50,000) and a customs revenue of £25,000 (Rs. 2,50,000). [Kalyan Diaries in Nairne's Konkan, 98.]
                                       State of West Thana 1760.
At the close of 1760 (November-December) the French scholar Anquetil du Perron made a journey from Surat to visit the Kanheri and Elephanta caves. Both in going and coming his route lay along the coast. He travelled in a palanquin with eight bearers, four armed sepoys, and a Parsi servant. He was himself armed with a pair of pistols and a sword, and had two passports one for the Marathas the other for the Muslmans.  Throughout the whole of Thana order seems to have been Well established. The Marathas found it difficult to protect their shores against pirates, but they were busy repairing and building forts. [Three chief sets of pirates harassed the Thana coasts at this time; the Sanganiana from the gulf of Cutch, the Maskat Arabs, and the Malabaris. Grose's Voyage, I. 41.] Both in going and in coming, Du Perron was free from the exactions either of highwaymen or of officials. Of the appearance of the country between Daman and Salsette he gives few details, except that from Nargol southwards, he occasionally mentions palm groves and notices the beautiful orchards of Agashi. There were Christians in several of the villages where he halted, and, though many of their churches and buildings were in ruins or in disrepair, some were in order, and, at Agashi, the road was full of Christians, going to church as freely as in a Christian land. With Salsette he was much taken. It was no wonder that it had tempted the Marathas, and if only the English could get hold of it, Bombay would be one of the best settlements in the east. If well managed it would yield £240,000 (Rs. 24,00,000) a year. It was full of villages almost all Christian. There were several ruined churches and convents, and the European priests had left. But the Marathas had allowed the Christians to keep some of their churches, and the native priests, under a native Vicar General, kept up the festivals of the church with as much pomp as at Goa. Their processions were made without the slightest danger, even with a certain respect on the part of the Hindus. A festival at Thana in which Du Perron took part was attended by several thousand Christians. The Maratha chief of the island did not live in, Salsette, but on the mainland in a fort commanding Thana. [Zend A vesta, I. ccclxix.-ccccxxix.], About the same time (1750) the traveller Tieffenthaler described the people of the inland parts of Thana as a kind of savages brought up in thick forests, black and naked except a strip of cloth round the loins. [Des. Hist. et Geog. I. 484]
                                    Bombay, 1760-1770.
Meanwhile, Bombay had been growing larger, richer, and healthier.

 In 1757 Ive describes it as the most flourishing town in the world ' the grand store-house of all Arabian and Persian commerce' [Ive's Voyage in Bom. Quar. Rev. V, 162.] In 1764 Niebuhr found the climate pleasant, the healthiness much improved since some ponds had been filled with earth. The products were rice, cocoanuts, and salt. The population had lately greatly increased:
 The old castle was not of much consequence, but the town was guarded on the land side by a good rampart, a large moat, and ravelins in front of the three gates. There were also towers at Mahim, Riva north of Dharavi, Sion, Suri, Mazgaon, and Varli. There were 300 native troops on the island, and, thanks to a Swiss, the artillery were in excellent order. The greatest work was the dock. The Marathas still continued to treat the English with rudeness. In 1760 they carried off a Bombay cruiser. War seemed certain, but the English had sent a large number of troops to Calcutta and Madras, and they chose a friendly settlement. [Niebuhr's Voyage en Arabie, II. 1-6]Another writer makes the population sixty thousand, and the sale of woollens and other English goods £140,000 (Rs. 14,00,000) a year. Still, he adds, the island does not pay.[Bombay in 1781, 6-7. Niebuhr (Voyage, II 2) gives the population at 140,000 on the estimate of an Englishman who had been in Bombay twenty years. There had been 70,000 when he came, and since he had come the number was doubled Sixty thousand is probably correct. The difference is probably partly due to the large section of the people who lived in Bombay only during the busy season. See below p. 516.]

 In 1766 Forbes found the climate in general healthy and pleasant, though a considerable tract was overflowed by the sea. The merchants traded with all the principal seaports and interior cities of. India, and extended their commerce to the Persian and Arabian gulfs, the coast of Africa, Malacca, China, and the eastern islands. The provision markets were well supplied from Salsette and the mainland, and every spot that would admit of cultivation was sown with rice or planted with cocoa palms. [Forbes' Oriental Memoirs, I. 22.] The town was about two miles in circumference, surrounded by modern fortifications. There were three excellent docks and a spacious marine-yard, where teak ships of all sizes were made by skilful Parsis, the exact imitators of the best European models. [Ship-building in Bombay dated from 1735, when Lavji Nasarvanji came from Surat, and in the next year was sent to open a teak trade with the Bhils and other wild tribes of the forests to the north. Bom. Quar. Rev. III. 332. On the ship building at Surat at this time see Stavorinus Voyages, III. 17-23 and Bombay Gazetteer, II 146. Grose's Voyage, I. 110.] Of public buildings there were a Government house, customs-house, marine-house, barracks mint, treasury, theatre, and prison. There were three hospitals, a Protestant church, and a charity school. The English houses were comfortable' and well furnished, not yet deserted for country villas. The street in the black town contained many good Asiatic houses, kept by Indians especially by Parsis. Bombay was one of the first marts in India, a place of great trade. The government was simple and regular, managed with order and propriety, but the revenue was always inadequate to the expenses. [Forbes' Oriental Memoirs, I. 151-155.] The outlay was seriously increased by the building of new fortifications in 1768. [Bombay in 1781, 8,9.] The Court of Directors and the Bombay Government agreed that, without the possession of some of the neighbouring lands, Bombay could not be held. The most suitable lands were Salsette and Bassein, Salsette for its rice and vegetables, Bassein for its timber. No chance of gaining these lands was to be allowed to pass. [Bombay in 1781, 9-10.] With this object a British envoy was sent to Poona in 1771. [Grant Duff, 371.] The Marathas refused to cede any land and added 500 men to the Thana garrison. In consequence of this refusal, knowing that the Portuguese had lately made vigorous reforms, and hearing that a fleet was on its way from Brazil to recover their late possessions, the Bombay Government determined to take Salsette by force. [The Portuguese had lately increased both the number and the size of their ships; they bad abolished the Inquisition, turned much of the riched of the churches to the use of the state, settled the administration of justice on a firm footing, and done much to encourage the military service. The force at Goa was 2240 infantry, 830 marines, 2000 natives, and 6000 sepoys. An army of 12,000 arrived from Brazil at Goa, and preparations were made to seize Bassein. (Chaul and Bassein, 150; Bombay in 1781, 73 footnote). The day after (13th December) the English sailed for Thana. the Portuguese fleet entered Bombay harbour and protested. O. Chron. de Tis. II. 14.]
Salsette Taken 1774.
On the 12th of December, 120 European artillery, 200 artillery lascars 500 European infantry, and 1000 sepoys, under the command of General Gordon, started from Bombay by water to Thana. On the 28th, after a serious repulse, the fort was carried by assault and most of the garrison were put to the sword. [Forbes (Or. Mem, I. 452) says that the expedition against Thana was in consequence of a treaty between the Select Committee of Bombay and Raghunathrav Peshwa, by which the islands were ceded to the British. But the first treaty with Raghunathrav was after, not before, the taking of Thana.] A second British force took Versova, and a third occupied Karanja, Elephanta, and Hog Island. [Forbes' Or. Mem. I. 463. In the fourteen years before the conquest of Salsette the revenue of Bombay amounted to £1,019,000 and the expenditure to £3,974,000; it had cost the Company nearly three millions sterling. The details are given in Milbura'a Oriental Commerce, I. lii, liii, lviii.] By the first of January 1775, Salsette and its dependencies, includiug Bassein, were in the possession of the British. In his dispute with Nana Fadnavis as to the legitimacy of the child whom Nana had declared heir to the late Peshwa, Raghunathrav had been arrested and forced to retire to Gujarat. On the 6th of March 1775, to obtain the help of the English, he agreed to a treaty, known as the treaty of Surat, under which Salsette and Bassein were ceded to the English. [Bombay in 1781, 101-102.] Bassein was soon after restored, but Salsette, Karanja, Hog Island, and Khanderi, which at the time of cession were estimated to yield a yearly revenue of £35,000 (Rs. 3,50,000), were given over to the English. [Aitchison's Treaties, V. 21-28. The Portuguese objected strongly to the action of the English in seeing Salsette. The correspondence continued till 1780, when Mr. Hornby snowed that the English Government had both justice and technical right in their favour. To this letter the Goa government were unable to answer. But representations through the court of Lisbon to the English Government were more successful. A despatch came out denouncing the conquest of Salsette as unseasonable, impolitic, unjust, and unauthorised, and advising the Bombay Government to cancel the treaty. But the cession had long been formally confirmed and no action was taken. Chaul and Bassein, 156,]
Bombay, 1775.
In August 1775, Parsons found Bombay an elegant town with numerous and handsome gentlemen's houses, well laid out streets, and a clean sandy soil. The esplanade was very large, and as smooth and even as a bowling green. Inside of the walls was a spacious green where several regiments could drill. Bombay castle was very large and strong, and the works round the town were so many and the bastions so strong and well placed, and the whole defended with so broad and deep a ditch, that, with a sufficient garrison and provisions, it might bid defiance to any force. Its dry-dock was perhaps better, and its graving dock and rope-walk were as good as any in England. The ships built in Bombay were as strong, handsome, and well finished as any ships built in Europe. [ Parsons' Travels, 214-217.]
At this time Salsette is described as having good water and a fruitful soil, yielding chiefly rice, capable of great improvement, and formerly the granary of Goa. Karanja yielded rice to the yearly value of £6000 (Rs. 60,000) and Elephanta about £800 (Rs. 8000). [Bombay in 1781, 2,3.] In 1774 Forbes, on his way to the Kanheri caves, passed through a country of salt wastes, rice fields, cocoa groves, wooded hills, and rich vallies. The island was infested by tigers and was full of the ruins of Portuguese churches, convents, and villas. [Forbes' Or. Mem. I. 428, III. 449.]
Shortly after the cession (May, 1775) the Marathas from Bassein landed on Salsette with 3500 men, but were repulsed with great loss.[ Bombay in 1781, 82.] A few months before (December 1774), at Gheria in Ratnagiri, Commodore John Moore, with the Revenge and the Bombay grab, had attacked and destroyed the chief ship of the Maratha navy, a vessel of forty-six guns. [Bombay in 1781, 84-85; Parsons' Travels, 217.] In 1776 an impostor, calling himself Sadashiv Chimnaji, gathered a large force and overran the Konkan. In October he marched up the Bor pass, but was driven out of the Deccan, and, seeking shelter with A'ngria, was made prisoner, and the Konkan speedily reduced to order. [Nairne's Konkan, 99.]
The English and Marthas.
Meanwhile the English Government in Calcutta, which had lately been made Supreme, disapproved of the support given to Raghunathrav, declared the treaty of Surat invalid, and sent their agent Colonel Upton to Poona to negotiate with the ministerial party. Under the terms of a treaty dated at Purandhar, near Poona, on the 1st of March 1776, it was agreed that an alliance between the British and the ministerial party should take the place of the alliance between the British and Raghunathrav or Raghoba. At the same time the British were to continue in possession of Salsette, Karanja, Elephanta, and Hog Island. [Aitchison's Treaties, V. 28-33. In spite of this affront from the Government of Bengal the Court of Directors approved the policy of the Bombay Government, preferring the treaty of Surat to the treaty of Purandhar. Grant Duff, 396, 406.]In spite of this treaty, the feeling of the ruling party at Poona of which Nana Fadnavis was the head, was strongly hostile to the English. When news arrived that war between England and France was imminent, Nana determined to make use of the French to lower the power of the English. In April 1778, St. Lubin and some other Frenchmen landed at Chaul and proceeded to Poona, and were there received with the highest honour [Bombay in 1781, 115-116.]. On St. Lubin's promise to bring a completely equipped French force to Poona, Nana concluded an alliance between France and the Marathas, granting the French the free use of the port of Chaul. [Bombay in 1781, 120, 143. On the 13th May 1778, Nana delivered a paper to St. Lubin, requiring the help of France to punish a nation ' who had raised up an insolent head and whose measure of injustice was full.' Ditto 163. Part of the French plan was an attack on Bombay. Ditto 168. They collected 5000 European soldiers and a supply of artillery at Mauritius. Ditto 304, 317, 326.] At the same time Nana treated the English Agent at Poona with marked discourtesy. A considerable party at Poona, whose leaders were Sakharam and Moroba, were hostile to Nana and were anxious to see Raghoba in power. Disappointed with the failure of the Purandhar treaty, and feeling that only by the overthrow of Nana could French influence at Poona be destroyed, the Governor General encouraged the Bombay government to come to an arrangement with Sakharam's party, and promised to send a force overland by Oudh and Berar to act with them in setting Raghoba in power in Poona. A strong force [Six battalions of sepoys with proportionate artillery and some cavalry. Grant Duff's Marathas, 406.] was directed to meet on the Jamna, opposite to Kalpi, and Colonel Leslie, who was placed in command, was instructed to march across India towards Bombay, and place himself under the orders of that Presidency. Colonel Leslie crossed the Jamna in May 1778, but, getting mixed with local disputes in Bundelkhand, he made little progress, and died on the 3rd of October 1778. [Grant Duff's Marathas, 420.]
English Advance on Poona, 1775.
On receipt of the instructions from the Supreme Government, the Governor of Bombay decided to make a fresh alliance with Raghoba on the terms of the Surat treaty of 1775. The English undertook to establish Raghoba in Poona, but stipulated that, unless he could prove that the young Peshwa was not the son of Narayanrav, Raghoba was to be placed in power merely as regent. In return Raghoba promised to cede Bassein and Khaderi island, the Atgaons which formed part of Salsette, and several districts in Gujarat. He also promised that, without the consent of the English, no European should be allowed to settle in the Peshwa's territory. [Aitchison's Treaties, V. 34-38. The Gujarat districts ceded under this treaty were Olpad in Surat, Jambusar. Amod, Hansot, and an assignment of £7500 on Ankleshvar in Broach.] The treaty was concluded in Bombay on the 24th of November 1778. On the 22nd of November, hearing that the ministerial party were taking steps to oppose Raghoba's march to Poona, a force of 8900 men was ordered to leave Bombay. [The details of the force were, 143 artillery with 500-lascars, 448 rank and file of European infantry, and 2278 sepoys, making with officers a total of 3900. Bombay in 1781, 173.] The military command was given to Colonel Egerton, but all negotiations were to be carried on by Messrs. Carnac and Mostyn who accompanied the force. On the 25th of November the first division, under Captain Stewart, took possession of the Bor pass and of the village of Khandala. Colonel Egerton, with the second division, seized Belapur, and, on the 26th November, encamped at Panvel. On the 15th December the whole army reached Khopivli, or Gampoli, at the foot of the Bor pass. Here, though they heard that the ministerial troops were gathering to bar their passage to Poona, they remained till the 23rd of December, spending the time in making a road for the guns up the Bor pass. Meanwhile the Maratha horse ranged in large bodies between Khopivli and Panvel, and caused much annoyance to the camp. To add to their misfortunes, Mr. Mostya, who alone had a thorough knowledge of Poona affairs, fell sick and returned to Bombay where he died on the 1st of January. Colonel Egerton's health also gave way. He resigned the command and left for Bombay, but the country was so full of Maratha horse that he was forced to return. On his return he resumed his place in the committee, but was succeeded in the command by Colonel Cockburn.
English Defeat 1779.
When the English force reached the Deccan, contrary to Raghoba's assurances, they found that the country was full of hostile horse, and that none of the chiefs were inclined to support Raghoba's cause. In skirmishes between Khandala and Karli, the British force was unfortunate in losing Colonel Cay and Captain Stewart, two of its best officers. [Colonel Cay and Captain Stewart were killed at Karli. Grant Duff, 413,] When they reached Talegaon, eighteen miles west of Poona, the town was in flames and there was a serious scarcity of supplies. A council was called, and, in spite of all that the ablest officers could urge, the majority determined to retreat. The retreating force was soon surrounded by Maratha horse, and, but for the courage and skill of Captain Hartley who commanded the rear guard, the greater part of the second division must have been- destroyed. At Vadgaon, about four miles west of Talegaon and twenty east of Khandala, a second council was called and the majority agreed that the troops could not stand another day of such fierce fighting. Accordingly, on the 15th, they entered into treaty with Nana Fadnavis and Sindia. Nana Fadnavis made the surrender of Raghoba a preliminary to any agreement. But the English were spared the dishonour of giving him up, as Raghoba had already placed himself under the protection of Sindia. Disappointed of the object he had most at heart, Nana declared that orders must be sent to Colonel Goddard to conduct his detachment back to Bengal, and that the English must surrender all the Maratha territory they had acquired, and that, until the lands were handed over, the army must remain at Vadgaon. The negotiations with Sindia were more successful. On the promise of the cession of Broach, he arranged that the army should be released, and they retired to Bombay guarded by the troops they had been accustomed to see fly before them. [Bombay in 1781, 188. About this time (1780) the Dutch were anxious to establish themselves at Bassein, but the negotiations failed. Da Cunha's Chaul and Bassein, 73-74.] In Bombay, joy at the return of the army was lost in the shame of the terms to which its leaders had submitted. At the council regret and recriminations were silenced. Our first duty,' said Governor Hornby (29th January), ' is to retrieve our affairs, our next is to inquire into the cause of failure.' He praised the courage of the army, blamed the commanding officers, and advised Colonel Egerton and Colonel Coekburn to abstain for the present from military duty. For his skill and courage in command of the rear guard he promoted Captain Hartley to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. [Mr. Carnac, Colonel Egerton, and Colonel Coekburn were dismissed the Company's service. Grant Duff, 418.] As Messrs. Carnac and Egerton had no authority to conclude a treaty, he held that the convention of Vadgaon was not binding. As regarded future dealings with the Marathas, he (19th February) gave his opinion that power in Poona was not in the hands of Nana but in the hands of Sindia, that Sindia was opposed to a French alliance and had shown himself friendly to the British, and that the British should make every effort to conclude an agreement with Sindia. As Raghoba was now a puppet in Sindia's hands, no further attempt should be made to raise him to power. The main objects of the English were to keep the French and Nana from any share in the government of Poona, and to preserve for the Company the territory they then held. [Bombay in 1781, 205. The depressed state of the English in 1780 is shown by the Maratha piracies to which they had to submit. The governor of Bassein, one of the Peshwa's admirals, used to attack English ships, and, if they succeeded in proving the offence, all they gained was the explanation that their ship was supposed to belong to some other nation.] Nana was told that Messrs. Carnac and Egerton had no power to conclude a treaty, and that the English repudiated the Vadgaon convention. An attempt was made to open negotiations with Sindia. But Hornby had overestimated Sindia's goodwill to the English. The Marathas insisted that the terms of the Vadgaon convention should be carried out, and that Salsette and the Gujarat territories should be ceded. To enforce their demands preparations were made, for attacking Salsette, but precautions prevented the attack, and the safe arrival of Colonel Goddard at Surat, on the 25th of February, changed the face of affairs.
Goddard's March,1779.
On Colonel Lewis' death on the 3rd of October, Colonel Goddard succeeded to the command of the army in Bundelkhand, and, in spite of great difficulty and danger, led his men through Bhopal and Hoshangabad to the banks of the Narbada, which he reached on the 16th of January 1779. His instructions were to act as the Bombay Government advised, and his advice from Bombay was to push to Junnar. On the 24th of January he received a letter from Mr. Carnac, dated the 11th, telling him that matters had changed, and advising him to give up Junnar and to march either to Bombay or to Surat, or, if he was not strong enough to do this, to stay in Berar. Colonel Goddard pushed on and reached Charvah, opposite Burhanpur, on the 30th of January. On the 2nd of February he received a letter from Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton, dated Khopivli the 19th of January, telling him not to act on their letter of the 16th, as, on consideration, they found that they had no power to give the orders which that letter contained. No letter dated the 16th had been received. But the probability that the Bombay force had met with a heavy disaster, led Goddard to press on to Surat. On the 9th he received Mr. Carnac's letter of the 16th of January ordering his return to Bengal.' After this, the march was carried on with such spirit that Surat was reached on the 25th of February, 300 miles, much of it wild and rugged, in nineteen days. [Bombay in 1781, 289.]
Negotiations with Poona, 1779.
On hearing that Colonel Goddard was safe in Surat the Supreme Government made him their minister to treat with the Marathas. The treaty of Purandhar was to be renewed, provided the Marathas agreed to withdraw claims based on the Vadgaon convention and never to admit French forces into their dominions. [Grant Duff, 424.] At the request of the Bombay Government, Goddard visited Bombay on the 15th of March 1779. He agreed with the Bombay Government that no steps should be taken, till a further letter was received from the Supreme Council. He then returned to his army at Surat. On the 29th of May he wrote to the Poona Court telling them that he had been charged with negotiations at Poona, and expressing the wish of the Supreme Council to conclude a lasting treaty with the Marathas. In the struggle for power between Nana and Sindia, Nana was most anxious to gain possession of Raghoba. In case Nana might succeed, Sindia sent Raghoba under escort to Burhanpur, and, on the way, Raghoba, suspecting that he would be thrown into confinement, escaped with a body of troops to Gujarat, and threw himself on the protection of Colonel Goddard. Goddard agreed to protect him, and, on the 12th of June, Raghoba joined the English camp. During the rains, negotiations went on between Colonel Goddard and the Poona Court. But, as the Marathas claimed the cession of Salsette and demanded the surrender of Raghoba, no advance was made. At the close of the year General Goddard visited Bombay. Mr. Hornby proposed that the British should form an alliance with the Gaikwar and attack the Peshwa's territory. This proposal was approved by the Supreme Government, and four companies of European infantry and two battalions of sepoys, under Colonel Hartley, were sent from Bombay to help Goddard in Surat. [Grant Duff, 429.]
War in the Konkan, 1780.
On the 1st of January 1780, Goddard marched from Surat, took Dabhoi, and agreed with the Gaikwar to divide the Peshwa's Gujarat possessions, the Gaikwar keeping the north and the British the south. Ahmadabad fell on the 15th of February, and the success was followed by the defeat of part of Sindia's army. [Grant Duff, 430-433.] At the request of the Bombay Government, Hartley was ordered from Baroda to Bombay on the 8th of May. This reinforcement was much wanted in the Konkan. To prevent the Marathas cutting off Bombay supplies, small bodies of troops had been posted at different parts of the Konkan. Four European subalterns, in charge of two companies of sepoys, took post on one of the Sahyadri passes, and another force under Captain Richard Campbell seized Kalyan. Enraged at the loss of Kalyan, Nana Fadnavis despatched a large force who took the British post on the Sahyadris, and, on arriving near Kalyan, sent a message to Captain Campbell demanding the surrender of the town. Campbell told them they were welcome to Kalyan if they could take it, and made a spirited defence. A Maratha, assault was planned for the 25th of May, but Colonel Hartley arrived, and, on the night of the 24th, surprised the Maratha camp, pursuing them for miles, and killing a great number. During the rest of the fair season the British remained unmolested in the Konkan. [Grant Duff, 434.] Shortly before the relief of Kalyan, the bravery and skill of Lieutenant Welsh had (23rd April) gained a great advantage to the British, by the capture of the three forts of Parnera, Bagvada, and Indragad, on the borders of Gujarat and the Konkan. [Grant Duff, 435. Parnera and Bagvada are in the south of Surat; Indragad is in the north of Dahanu. See Places of Interest, Indragad,] After the beginning of the rains the Marathas attacked the different posts in small parties, but Kalyan was well garrisoned and was not molested. [Grant Duff, 435.]
On the third of August, the night on which the fort of Gwalior was surprised by Captain Popham, Captain Abington marched about ten miles south from Kalyan, and attempted to surprise the important fort of Malanggad or Bawa Malang. He secured the lower hill, but the garrison were able to retreat to the upper fort, and its mass of sheer rock defied assault. [Grant Duff, 437.] Meanwhile the Bombay Government were hardpressed for funds. They had looked for help to Bengal, but the whole strength of Bengal was strained to meet Haidar Ali's attack on Madras. Bombay had no resource but in its own efforts. The only means of raising a revenue was to overran the enemies' territory as soon as the rains were over. With this object Goddard was asked to besiege Bassein, and, early in October, five battalions were placed under Colonel Hartley, with orders to drive out as many of the enemy's posts as possible and secure the rice harvest. He was to arrange his movements so as to hold the country between the Sahyadris and Bassein, and prevent the Marathas from strengthening that fort. Colonel Hartley's first service was, on the 1st of October, to relieve Captain Abington whose retreat from Malanggad to Kalyan had been cut off by a force of Marathas. The relief was completely successful and was effected with little loss. The troops pursued the Marajhas to the Bor pass and enabled the Bombay Government to gather the greater part of the Thana revenue. [Grant Duff, 438.] General Goddard arrived before Bassein on the 13th of November. On account of its strength he determined to attack by regular approaches, and completed his first battery on the 28th of November. The Marathas strained every nerve to recover the konkan and relieve Bassein. Large bodies of troops were hurried down, and Colonel Hartley, after a month's fighting, was forced to retire towards Dugad about nine miles east of Bassein.
Battle of Dugad, 1780.
Finding that they could not succour Bassein, the Marathas determined to destroy Hartley's army. On the 10th of December upwards of 20,000 men thrice attacked the Bombay division in front and rear, but each time were repulsed with slight loss though two of the slain were officers. On the eleventh the attack was repeated with heavier loss to the British, including two more officers. During the night Hartley fortified two heights, that covered his flanks. Next morning at daybreak the Marathas attempted a surprise. But they were met with so deadly a fire, that they were forced to retire with the loss of their leader Ramchandra, who was slain, and of Signior Noronha, a Portuguese officer, who was wounded. Bassein had fallen on the day before the battle of Dugad (11th December), and, on the day after the battle, Goddard joined Hartley's camp. [Grant Duff, 440. The British loss at Bassein was only thirteen, one of them, Sir John Gordon, an officer. Details of the siege of Bassein and of Hartley's battle at Dugad are given under Places of Interest, Bassein and Dugad.] Though Bassein had fallen, Goddard was detained for about a month (18th January 1781) by the island fort of Arnala about ten miles north of Bassein.
Goddard's Retreat, 1781.
Haidar Ali's success, in Madras made the Supreme Government anxious to come to terms with the Marathas. In the hope that a show of vigour might make the Marathas more, willing for peace, Goddard pushed to the foot of the Bor pass, his advanced party forcing the pass on the night of the 8th of February and encamping at Khandala, while Goddard, with the head-quarters, remained below at Khopivli. [The total strength of his force was 6152 men, 640 Europeans and 5512 Natives. Grant Duff, 443 note.] This movement proved a failure. Nana Fadnavis was in no way affected by it. He refused to treat with the British unless the treaty included his ally Haidar Ali, and he sent a force of 12,000 men to cut off Goddard's communication with Panvel. On the 15th of March the Marathas attacked a convoy of grain near Chauk and caused severe loss. Goddard proposed to make a fort on the Bor pass and Mr. Hornby proposed to garrison Rajmachi, but neither suggestion was carried out and Goddard prepared to return to Bombay. Nana kept on sending troops into the Konkan, and held the country between Khopivli and Panvel in such strength, that a convoy, sent by Goddard for grain, was unable to return from Panvel without the help of every disposable man from the Bombay garrison, or without the loss of 106 men killed and wounded. On the 19th of April Goddard brought his guns and baggage from the top of the Bor pass and prepared to march towards Panvel. Every movement was watched by three great bodies of Maratha horse. There were 15,00 (1 men at the foot of the Kusur pass, 12,000 near Bhimashankar, and 25,000 at the top of the Bor pass. On the 20th, the moment that Goddard began his march, the Deccan force poured into the Konkan and captured much of his baggage. On the 20th, Goddard moved seven miles to Khalapur, and next day seven miles to Chauk. On the way his loss was severe, the Marathas attacking the rear, assailing the front, and keeping up a steady fire from behind rocks and bushes. On the 22nd the British baited at Chauk. Early in the morning of the 23rd, the baggage was sent ahead and some distance was covered before the enemy came up. Then the attack was so severe that Goddard made a show of pitching his tents and the enemy withdrew; The army reached Panvel on the evening of the 23rd April, without further annoyance, but with the loss of 466 killed and wounded, of whom eighteen were European officers. The Marathas considered Goddard's retreat one of their greatest victories. [Grant Duff, 447.] From Panvel part of Goddard's army was drafted to Madras; the rest were moved to Kalyan and there spent the rains. A large Maratha force was sent towards Gujarat and their garrisons strengthened. [Grant Duff, 447.]
Treaty of Salbai, 1782.
During the rains (June-November 1781) the Bombay Government were extremely hardpressed for money. Several schemes for carrying on the war on a large scale had to be set aside for want of funds. [One suggestion which was fully considered, but finally rejected, was that certain Maratha deshmukhs, whose ancestors had held lands under the Muhammadans, should put the English in possession of the Konkan, the English giving them £5000 (Rs. 50,000) for each of the larger and £1000 (Rs. 10,000) for each of the smaller forts, and allowing them to keep all money, jewels, and wares they might capture. Grant Duff, 450-451.] During the next fair season defensive operations continued in the Konkan. But the great power of Haidar Ali made peace with the Marathas so important that, at last, on the 17th May 1782 the treaty of Salbai was concluded. One of its chief provisions was the restoration of all territory conquered from the Marathas since the treaty of Purandhar in 1775. This reduced the British possessions in the north Konkan to Bombay, Salsette, and the three small islands of Elephanta, Karanja, and Hog Island. [Aitehison's Treaties, V. 41. Grant Duff, 452. The treaty was not finally exchanged till the 24th February 1783.] Bassein had to be given up, but from Maratha delay in completing the treaty it was not actually transferred till April 1783.[Grant Duff, 457. Under the treaty of Salbai the Marathas agreed to pay Raghunathrav an allowance. He retired to Kopargaon on the Godavari and soon after died. His son Bajirav was nine years old at his father's death, and a posthumous son Chimnaji Appa was born soon after. Grant Duff, 459.] About the time when the treaty of Salbai was concluded, the Marathas confirmed the Jawhar chief in the small territory which they had left him [Bom. Gov. Sel. [New Series], XXVI. 15.]
State of Thana, 1780.
During the disturbances that ended in the treaty of Salbai the district had suffered severely. In February 1781, every village, hut, and stack, on the high road between Kalyan and Khopivli, had been burnt, and most of the people had fled. [Belapur, Karanja, and Kalyan M.S. diaries in Nairne's Konkan, 103.] Even the rich coast tract seems to have become impoverished, as the loss of seventy-five carts and forty-four oxen is said to have caused great distress to the district of Bassein. [Belapur, Karanja, and Kalyan MS. diaries in Nairne's Konkan, 103.] The scarcity of money in Bombay made a liberal policy in Salsette impossible. The island showed few signs of improvement. Mr. Forbes, who revisited the Kanheri caves in 1783, was astonished to find that, during the ten years Salsette had been under the Company, tillage had not spread. The gentle hills and valleys in the centre of the island were still in their former state of wildness. [Or. Mem. III. 451. The writer of the Account of Bombay (1781) describes Salsette as well watered, fruitful, and capable of great improvement, pp. 2-3. In his account of the Kanheri caves, Macneil (Archaeologia, VIII. 253) tells a tale which shows, how, in those rough days, the strong bullied the weak. On his way to the caves, he and his palanquin-bearers met a string of about a hundred girls, carrying baskets of dried fish to market. As Macneil drew near, the girls took to flight, the bearers chasing them and taking by force some handfuls of fish from as many of the baskets as they could lay hold of. Macneil forbore punishing his men, as he learned ' that custom hallowed the act and that the tax was a constant perquisite of these gentlemen of the road.] In the Maratha districts, on the way to the hot springs of Vajrabai, about twelve miles north of Bhiwndi, were fields of rice, pulse, and a little tobacco. Mango trees abounded and there were a few lime trees, plantains, and guavas round the Vajrabai temples. Grass grew to a surprising height and there was abundance of flowers and fragrant herbs. The people were lazy, living from hand to mouth, partly because industry was never the character of the Maratha, partly from the unhappy constitution of the government and the confused state of the country, [ Or. Mem. IV. 248.]
Four years later, in the rains of 1787 (15th August-11th September) the Polish traveller Dr. Hove made several botanical trips through Salsette and the neighbouring mainland. Salsette showed signs of great decay; it was thinly peopled and poorly tilled. From Versova to Thana Hove did not find a single village or any signs of tillage. There was teak of an amazing height and thickness, and there were remains of churches, chapels, and large buildings all pining in decay. Near Thana there was some rich rice tillage, [Tours, 13-16. According to Hove the practice of sowing rice in beds and planting it out in tufts had only lately been introduced from Gujarat. It saved seed and trebled the outturn. Ditto, 13,] and at Dharavi, in the west, rice, sugarcane, and vegetables were grown. But in the south-east, while there were remains of wells and marks of former tillage, there was a large waste area of level land fit for sugarcane and rice. The produce of the island was not enough to maintain the garrison and town of Thana.[Tours, 14.] The Maratha mainland was even more deserted than Salsette. Between Thana and Vajrabai there was not a single village, and travelling was dangerous from tigers, of whom five were seen in one day, from buffaloes who pursued Europeans like enemies, and from natives who were such enthusiasts for their religion that they looked on Europeans as the lowest on earth and did not scruple to kill them. [Tours, 17, 19, 20.]
In the January following (1788) Hove travelled down the west coast from Surat to Bassein. The Thana part of the country was well watered and on the whole fertile. The hills yielded the finest teak and the valleys high grass, and on some of the flats, near Nargol, grew a luxuriant wild sugarcane. [Tours, 98, 99.] The extreme north was very wild, the hills were covered with unbroken forest, and the valleys were overgrown with grass. Further south, between Umbargaon and Dahanu, the ruggedness disappeared, the coast lands were plain and rich, and the hills yellow and bare. South of Dahanu, almost the whole way to Bassein, the coast strip was rich and well tilled with rice, sugarcane, and plantains. [Tours, 99, 100.] During the day the thermometer was never less than 89°, but the nights were unexpectedly cold, small pools of water being frozen over near Maroli on the night of the thirteenth January. The valleys were full of brushwood and bastard poon, Sterculia foetida. Along the coast, between Umbargaon and Dahanu, were large groves of brab-palms, and further north, near Maroli, the country abounded in teak of a prodigious size, several of the trees measuring over twelve feet in girth and not less than eighty feet high. [According to Hove the Kolis made teak plantations, sowing the seeds at the end of the hot season, and tended the young trees lopping side shoots. Teak seemed to thrive best in rocky places and was chiefly used for ship building. Tours, 97.] In the rich coast strip between Dahanu and Bassein, rice, yams, and turmeric were grown. There were also sugarcane gardens with plantains and pomegranates, the canes very flourishing, fifteen feet high and thick in proportion.[Tours, 99, 100. According to Hove the growth of sugarcane had been introduced only eight years before (1780). It had spread so rapidly that, instead of importing sugar, the people of Bassein were able to send it to Bombay and Surat. They had not learned the art of refining sugar.] In the north there were many tigers. Not a day passed that several were not started. Some of the villages had herds of cattle hunch-backed and small, miniatures of the Gujarat oxen, and so moderate in price that any number might have been bought at 2s. (Re. 1) a head. There were some sheep with wool as soft and white as Gujarat cotton. [Tours, 101.] Except the rich coast the country was poorly peopled and badly tilled. From the north to Bassein Hove did not see more than thirteen villages. The people were dark, slender, active, and long lived. They ate all animal food except the ox, and drank liquor freely. Their winter clothing was of wool. Their villages, especially in the hills, were small, of not more than thirteen families. They were pining in poverty and destitute of comfort. Though the country was so rough the coast route was passable for carts. Hove had a horse and two carts, and he talks of hundreds of hackeries, between Umbargaon and Dahanu, coming to load jars of palm-juice.
The country seems to have been free from robbers. All along the route, especially in the north, were posts of mounted guardsmen who lived in small thatched huts, tilled a plot of land, and were armed with a sabre, a spear, and a matchlock. One of their chief duties was to give alarm on the appearance of an enemy. They stopped travellers, and, if. they had not passes, took them to the chief officer of the district, who closely examined them. There were also posts at every ferry, and no one could pass without heavily feeing the head of the watch. The Maratha officers pillaged openly and forced travellers to give whatever they chose to ask. Gujarat, though full of robbers, was less troublesome and cheaper to travel in. [Tours, 103. In crossing the Dahanu river and the Vaitarna, Hove had each time to pay Rs. 10. At Bassein he had to pay Rs. 12 to men to whom he showed his passes, and he was charged Rs. 43 for a boat from Bassein to Mahim. Ditto 100, 101, 102, and 103.]
In 1783 Forbes found Bombay greatly increased since 1774. The troubles on the mainland had driven people to Bombay, and a flourishing commerce had drawn others. Provisions and supplies were plentiful, but prices were high, double what they used to be. The island was almost covered with houses and gardens. It would soon be a city like Surat or Ahmadabad. [Forbes' Oriental Memoirs, III. 436-7. Abbe Reynal gives the population in 1780 at 100,000 (I. 378-379). Franeklin (Pinkerton' s Voyages, IX. 236) describes Bombay in 1786 as very beautiful and as populous for its size as any island in the world. It had a splendid harbour, an excellent dock, and a ship-building yard with very ingenious and dexterous shipwrights, not inferior to the best in England. Merchants and others had come to settle from the Deccan, the Malabar and Coromandel coasts, and from Gujarat. There were eight battalions of sepoys, a regiment of European infantry, and European artillery and engineers. The chief work of note was a causeway, a mile long and forty feet broad.]
In 1790 Thana, with other parts of Western India, suffered from a failure of rain and from famine. [Etheridge's Famines, 117.] In 1793 a great part of Salsette appeared to be lying waste. But an attempt had lately been made to grow sugarcane and indigo, and a Dr. Stewart from Bombay was superintending the infant plantations. [Moor's Operations, 370.] Shortly after this a few large estates were granted to British subjects with the view of improving the country. [Manuscript Records in Nairne's Konkan, 124. Several of the present large landholders in Salsette derive their rights from these grantees. Ditto.] In 1801 a permanent settlement was offered to the holders of land in Salsette, but only four landholders accepted the offer. [Manuscript Records in Nairne's Konkan, 124,] During the last fifteen years of the eighteenth century, trade, especially the Chinese cotton trade, had brought much money into Bombay. The prosperity and growth of the city improved it as a market for field produce, and, by the opening of the Sion causeway and the abolition of customs dues (1798-1803), Salsette was able to take full advantage of the increased demand. [Manuscript Records in Nairne's Konkan, 124. Details of the Salsette revenue system are given in the Land Administration Chapter.]
In the struggles for power at Poona, between Sindia, Nana Fadnavis, and Bajirav the young Peshwa, the government of the inland parts of the district fell into feebleness and decay. The country suffered severely from the raids of Deccan Kolis. A gang over 1000 strong divided into two or three parties, robbed villages at their leisure, shared the spoil, and disappeared to their homes. The guards posted in different places among the hills could do nothing to stop them. [Trans. Bom. Geog. Soc. I. 257.]